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Introduction
The Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (CISG) 1
endeavors to increase international trade through the creation of a uniform
law of international sales.2 By all counts, the CISG represents the interna-
tional community's most ambitious effort to promote efficiency and sus-
tained growth of international trade.3
The CISG entered into force for the United States on January 1, 1988. 4
It currently governs the sale of goods between the United States and six of
1. See U.N. Doc. A/Conf./97/18 Annex I (Apr. 10, 1980), GAOR, 33d Sess., Supp.
35 (A/35/35) at 217; 52 Fed. Reg. 40 6262-6280 (Mar. 2, 1987); reprinted in 19 I.L.M.
668-99 (1980). The United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale
of Goods, 15 U.S.C.A. App. (West 1998) [hereinafter CISG or Convention].
2. These goals are evident in the Preamble to the CISG which states in part:
Being of the opinion that the adoption of uniform rules which govern contracts
for the international sale of goods and take into account the different social,
economic and legal systems would contribute to the removal of legal barriers in
international trade and promote the development of international trade, [the
parties have agreed to the CISGI.
Id.
See also Amy A. Kirby, Punitive Damages in Contract Actions: The Tension Between the
United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods and U.S. Law,
16 J.L. & CoM. 215, 224 (1997) (observing that "[tihe CISG was drafted with the under-
lying policy of unifying the diverse commercial law systems of the world in an attempt to
foster increased international trade and economic growth."). See generally Maureen T.
Murphy, United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods: Cre-
ating Uniformity in International Sales Law, 12 FoRHAM INT'L Lj. 727 (1989).
The uniform rules of the CISG cover formation of contracts, the obligations of buyer
and seller, the passage of risk, and remedies available to both parties in case of breach of
contract. See generally CISG, supra note 1.
3. See, e.g., the North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17, 1992, U.S.-Can.-
Mex., 32 I.L.M. 289 [hereinafter NAFTA]; European Union, Single European Act, OJ.L.
169/1 (1987), [1987] 2 C.M.L.R. 741 (amending the Treaty establishing the European
Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957, 28 U.N.T.S. 11, 1973 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 1 (Cmd.
5179-11), in Treaties Establishing the European Communities (E.C. Off'l. Pub. Off.
1987)); Central American Common Market, General Treaty on Central American Inte-
gration, Dec. 13, 1960, 455 U.N.T.S. 3; Southern Common Market, Treaty of Ascuncion,
Mar. 26, 1991, 30 I.L.M. 1041; Caribbean Community, Treaty Establishing the Carib-
bean Community, opened for signature, July 4, 1973, 947 U.N.T.S. 17 (entered into force
Aug. 1, 1973); Andean Pact, Official Codified Text of the Cartegena Agreement Incorpo-
rating the Quito Protocol, 28 I.L.M. 1165 (1989); Association of Southeast Asian
Nations, see Peter Kenevan & Andrew Winden, Flexible Free Trade: The ASEAN Free
Trade Area, 34 HAv. INT'L LJ. 224 (asserting that although ASEAN began as a political
union, modern trends have moved it toward an economic one).
4. See infra notes 33-37.
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its top ten trading partners,5 including Canada, Mexico, China and the
European Union.6 Despite the CISG's political and economic significance
to the United States, for the past decade, U.S. courts and attorneys have
overlooked, misconstrued, and misapplied the terms of the Convention.
Most commentators, however, have dismissed the U.S. legal system's recal-
citrance and agree that the CISG brings general uniformity to the law of
international sales. 7
5. The CISG governs all the members of NAFTA, as well as most members of the
European Union. The CISG governs transactions involving three of the top five trading
partners of the United States and six of its top 10 trading partners (this includes Singa-
pore which has also ratified the CISG). Office of Trade & Economic Analysis, U.S.
Aggregate Foreign Trade Data - Table 9 (last modified July 1998) <http://
www.ita.doc.gov/industry/otea/usfth/t09.prn>. See infra note 34 for a list of all nations
which have ratified the CISG.
6. Mexico ratified the CISG on December 29, 1987 (took effect January 1, 1989);
Canada ratified the CISG on April 23, 1991 (took effect May 1, 1992). The People's
Republic of China ratified the CISG December 11, 1986 (took effect January 1, 1988).
The European Union nations that have ratified the CISG are: Austria, December 29,
1987 (took effectJanuary 1,1989); Belgium, October 31, 1996 (took effect November 1,
1997); Denmark, February 14, 1989 (took effect March 1, 1990); Finland, December 15,
1987 (took effect January 1, 1989); France, August 6, 1982 (took effect January 1,
1988); Germany, December 21, 1989 (January 1, 1991); Italy, December 11, 1986 (took
effect January 1, 1988); Luxembourg, January 30, 1997 (took effect February 1, 1998);
Netherlands, December 13, 1990 (took effect January 1, 1992); Spain, July 24, 1990
(took effect August 1, 1991); Sweden, December 15, 1987 (took effectJanuary 1, 1989).
CISG Contracting States and Declarations Table, 16 J.L. & COM. 371 (1997) [hereinafter
Table] (including information on the participants to the CISG and their ratification
dates).
7. See, e.g., Volker Behr, The Sales Convention in Europe: From Problems in Drafting
to Problems in Practice, 17J.L. & CoM. 263, 264 (1998) (stating that "[flrom the point of
view of legislation as well as from the point of view of practical application, the Conven-
tion seems to be a success. Moreover, this success may fuel further uniformity as it is
already influencing other fields of international trade law."); Ronald A. Brand & Harry
M. Flechtner, Recent Development: CISG: Arbitration And Contract Formation in Interna-
tional Trade: First Interpretations of The U.N. Sales Convention, 12J.L. & COM. 239, 239
(1993) (observing that "[t]he acceptance of the rules of CISG by nations with widely
differing domestic legal systems located on every inhabited continent holds the promise
of a quantum jump in the uniformity of legal rules governing sales transactions, with
significant benefits for international trade."); V. Susanne Cook, CISG: From the Perspec-
tive of the Practitioner, 17J.L. & CoM. 343, 349 (1998) (concluding that "[the] CISG has
been a tremendous international success .... It has clearly achieved one of its main
goals and objectives: the creation of a uniform body of international sales law with
almost universal acceptance."); Franco Ferrari, General Principles and International Uni-
form Commercial Law Conventions: A Study of the 1980 Vienna Sales Convention and the
1988 UNIDRIOT Conventions on International Factoring and Leasing, 10 PACE INT'L L.
REv. 157, 157 (1998) (observing that "[almong the most important conventions on uni-
form commercial law in force... [is] the 1980 United Nations Convention on Contracts
for the International Sale of Goods .... The CISG assumes importance due to its great
success [at unifying commercial law]"); Francis A. Gabor, Emerging Unification of Con-
flict of Laws Rules Applicable to the International Sale of Goods: UNCITRAL and the New
Hague Conference on Private International Law, 7 J. INT'L L. Bus. 696, 725 (1986)
(stressing that "[e]ffective unification of international commercial law may only be
accomplished on a worldwide basis.... One of the most successful accomplishments of
this legal process is the adoption of the United Nations Convention on Tracts for the
International Sale of Goods."); Michael P. Van Alstine, Consensus, Dissensus, and Con-
tractual Obligation Through the Prism of Uniform International Sales Law, 37 VA. J. INT'L
L. 1, 6 (1996) (concluding that "[ilt can be said with little risk of overstatement that the
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This article challenges the belief that the CISG accomplishes its goal of
uniformity; instead, this article contends that the CISG is actually an obsta-
cle to uniformity in the law of international sales. The failure of the CISG
to create uniformity is the result of the treaty's misguided goal, its charac-
ter as a multinational treaty, its specific provisions, and its incorporation
into the United States as a self-executing treaty. The combination of these
elements results in several specific problems which prevent uniformity in
both the interpretation and application of the CISG. First, as a self-execut-
ing treaty under U.S. law, the CISG is virtually unknown to U.S. courts and
practitioners. The result is that the CISG is frequently ignored by both U.S.
attorneys and courts. Second, the CISG's rules on interpretation are so
obscure that the treaty's own guidelines for producing consistent interpre-
tations fail to promote uniformity. Third, the treaty's provisions regarding
contractual freedom lead to bewildering and potentially contradictory
results which prevent uniformity in application of the treaty. Fourth, the
Convention's failure to define its subject matter prevents uniform applica-
tion. Finally, the CISG's allowance for certain reservations by nations rati-
fying the treaty insidiously undermines the treaty's goal of uniformity.
Fortunately, many of these problems can be eliminated or at least ame-
liorated by three changes: U.S. federal legislation, UNCITRAL review of all
court decisions involving the CISG, and a broad interpretive approach by
courts when called upon to apply the CISG.
Section I of this Article begins with a concise history of the treaty's
development. Section II addresses the CISG's nature under U.S. law as a
self-executing treaty. Section III analyzes how the specific provisions gov-
United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods represents
one of history's most successful efforts at the unification of the law governing interna-
tional transactions.") (Footnote omitted.); Del Pilar Perales Viscasillas, Recent Develop-
ment Relating to CISG: Contract Conclusion Under CISG, 16J.L. & COM. 315, 315 (1997)
(emphasizing that "[the] wide acceptance on the part of states with different social,
legal, and economic systems demonstrates the considerable success achieved by the
Convention."); Honorable Diane P. Wood, Regulation in the Single Global Market: From
Anarchy to World Federalism? 23 OHIo N.U. L. REv. 297, 302 (1996) (writing that "[iln
the area of private law, harmonized or uniform global rules have also been evolving.
One of the most successful examples is the United Nations Convention on Contracts for
the International Sale of Goods . . . ."); Maureen T. Murphy, Note, United Nations Con-
vention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods: Creating Uniformity in Interna-
tional Sales Law, 12 FoRAmu Irr'L L.J. 727 (1989) (discussing the unifying effects of the
CISG on international contract law). Cf. Harry M. Flechtner, The Several Texts Of the
CISG in a Decentralized System: Observations on Translations, Reservations and Other
Challenges to the Uniformity Principle in Article 7(1), .17 J.L. & CoM. 187, 216 (1998)
(mentioning that "compared to the 'Babel of diverse domestic legal systems' that it
replaced, the Convention represents vast progress towards a uniform international sales
law. However, it does not and could not achieve perfect uniformity.") (emphasis added).
See also Bradley J. Richards, Note, Contracts for the International Sale of Goods: Applica-
bility of the United Nations Convention, 69 IowA L. REv. 209, 216 (1983) (concluding that
"[tihe widespread support for the CISG foreshadows the ultimate success of the long-
standing effort to unify important aspects of international trade law."); A. H. Herman,
Business and the Law: Handle with Care - A.H. Hermann on Some Pitfalls of Foreign Trade
under the Vienna Convention, FIN. TIMES, Sept. 21, 1993 (concluding that "[the CISG
represents the] biggest success so far achieved by inter-governmental attempts at unifica-
tion of commercial laws.").
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erning interpretation of the CISG undermine its goal of uniformity. Sec-
tion IV analyzes how the treaty's rules on contract formation and choice of
law encourage a variety of results rather than uniformity. Section V
addresses the confusion caused by the Convention's failure to define
"goods." Finally, Section VI examines how individual national reserva-
tions to the treaty prevent rather than assist uniformity. The article con-
cludes with a summary of the solutions proposed in the previous sections
which will enable the treaty to continue as a worthwhile international
effort to harmonize the law of international sales.
I. Historical Background
A. Previous Efforts to Regulate International Sales
The desire for, and effects of, increased trade levels in the twentieth century
provided the impetus for the nations of the world to harmonize interna-
tional sales law.8 The initial pressure to create an international law of sales
arose from the dramatic increase in international trade.9 The second pres-
sure to harmonize international commercial law came from the realization
that harmonization law would further increase the level of international
trade.10
Nations first recognized the desirability of uniformity in international
sales in the 1920s.11 By 1930 the International Institute for the Unifica-
tion of Private Law (UNIDROIT), under the auspices of the League of
Nations, began specific efforts to establish an international treaty which
would harmonize the law of international sales. 12 Though interrupted by
the Second World War, that effort continued until the 1960s, when inter-
ested nations convened a conference in the Hague in 1964.13 That confer-
ence adopted two uniform laws: the Convention Relating to the Uniform
Law on the International Sale of Goods (ULIS), 14 and the Convention relat-
ing to a Uniform Law on the Formation of International Contracts for the
8. See THE CONVENTION FOR THE INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS: A HANDBOOK OF
BASiC MATERIALS 3 (Daniel Barstow Magraw & Reed R. Kathrein, eds., 2d ed. 1990).
9. See Hannu Honka, Harmonization Of Contract Law Through International Trade:
A Nordic Perspective, 11 TUL. EUR. & Civ. L.F. 111, 113 (1996) (observing that
"[e]xpanding trade will probably increase the number of international contracts con-
cluded and especially the economic volume involved, and further necessitate the harmo-
nized handling of contractual disputes. This is no novel basis; the same justification
underlay the medieval European lex mercatoria.")
10. See Michael Kabik, Through the Looking-Glass: International Trade in the "Won-
derland" of the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods,
9 Ir'L TAx & Bus. LAv 408, 409 (1992).
11. See Franco Ferrari, Specific Topics of the CISG in the Light of Judicial Application
and Scholarly Writings, 15 J.L. & CoM. 1, 5 (1995).
12. See Kazuaki Sono, The Vienna Sales Convention: History and Perspective, in INTER-
NATIONAL SALE OF GOODS: DUBROVNIK LECTUREs 2 (Petar Sarcevic & Paul Volken eds.,
1986).
13. See id.
14. Convention Relating to a Uniform Law on the International Sale of Goods, July
1, 1964, 834 U.N.T.S 107 [hereinafter ULIS].
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Sale of Goods (ULF). i5 The 1964 Hague Conventions entered into force in
1972;16 however, because these treaties are generally considered too far-
reaching in their scope, most countries, including the United States, have
refused to adopt them. 17
B. The Creation of the CISG
The failure of the 1964 Hague treaties to gain widespread acceptance
prompted the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law
(UNCITRAL) 18 to form the Working Group on the International Sale of
Goods in 1969 and charge it with the task of drafting the text for a new,
more widely acceptable treaty on the international sale of goods. 19 The
early discussions in UNCITRAL focused on efforts to revise the two 1964
Hague Conventions: ULF and ULIS.20 Eventually, after a process of draft-
ing, soliciting comments from U.N. members and international organiza-
tions and revising in light of those comments, 2 1 UNCITRAL adopted the
1978 Draft Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods.2 2
In March 1980 the United Nations convened a conference in Vienna to
consider adoption of a treaty based on the 1978 draft.2 3 The Vienna con-
ference divided its work between two Committees: the First Committee
preparing Parts I-11 (Arts. 1-88) of the CISG, the Second Committee pre-
paring Part IV (Arts. 89-101) and the Protocol Amending the Convention
on the Limitation Period in the International Sale of Goods. 2 4 On April 11,
1980, with relatively few amendments to the 1978 draft,2 5 the sixty-two
15. Convention Relating to a Uniform Law on the Formation of Contracts for the
International Sale of Goods, July 1, 1964, 834 U.N.T.S. 169 (1972) [hereinafter ULF].
16. See Helen Elizabeth Hartnell, Rousing the Sleeping Dog: The Validity Exception to
the Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, 18 YALE INT'L L. 1, 36
n.140 (1993).
17. Although both treaties are still in force, only Belgium, Germany, Gambia, Israel,
Italy, the Netherlands, San Marino and the United Kingdom are party to both. See Amer-
ican Bar Association Report to the House of Delegates, 18 INT'L LAW 39, 41 n. 4 (1984).
18. The United Nations created UNCITRAL in 1966 in order to promote "the pro-
gressive harmonization and unification of the law of international trade." G.A. Res.
2205, U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 99, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966), reprinted in
[1970] 1 Y.B. UNCITRAL 65, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/SER.A/1970.
19. See U.N. Doc. A/CONF./97/5, at 8-9 (1979).
20. See JOHN HONNOLD, UNIFORM LAW FOR INTERNATIONAL SALES UNDER THE 1980
UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION 37 (1987).
21. See Sono, supra note 12, at 5.
22. The Commission adopted the revised texts at its 10th and 11th sessions. 32
U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 17) para. 35, U.N. Doc. A/32/17 (1977). 33 U.N. GAOR Supp.
(No. 17) para. 28, U.N. Doc. A/33/17 (1978). It combined the revised ULF and ULIS
into a single Draft Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods. Id.,
para. 18.
23. See Sono, supra note 12, at 5.
24. See HONNOLD, supra note 20, at 38.
25. In researching the 1980 Conference one should note that "all [1980 Conference]
references relate to provisions to provisions as they were numbered in the 1978 Draft."
Id. at 37.
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participating countries26 unanimously adopted27 the Final Act of the
United Nations Conference on Contracts for the International Sale of
Goods. In the Final Act the participating nations approved six official
CISG texts: Arabic, English, French, Spanish, Chinese and Russian.28
Following U.S. Senate approval on October 9, 1986,29 the United
States deposited its ratification of the treaty with the United Nations Secre-
tariat on December 11, 1986.30 OnJanuary 1, 1988, pursuant to the terms
of Article 99 of the Convention,3 1 the CISG entered into force 32 for eleven
countries, including the United States.33 To date, over fifty nations have
ratified the CISG,34 making it the most significant international treaty on
international sales.35 Indeed, the CISG now constitutes the law governing
international sales in countries that account for over two-thirds of interna-
tional trade.36
Although acceptance of the CISG continues to spread, the following
sections document how provisions within the CISG actually undermine the
Convention's goal of increasing international trade through the creation of
a uniform law of international sales.
26. See Final Act of the United Nations Conference on the Contracts for the Sale of Inter-
national Goods, reprinted in United Nations Conference on Contracts for the International
Sale of Goods, Official Records at 176-77, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.97/19 (1981).
27. The adoption of the official text of a Convention (i.e., signing the Final Act of a
conference) does not obligate a nation to sign or ratify the treaty represented by that
text. See J.M. JONES, FULL POWERS AND RATiFICATIoN 79 (1949).
28. See CISG, supra note 1, 19 I.L.M. at 671.
29. See United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods,
15 U.S.C.A. App. (West 1998). The United States signed the Convention on August 31,
1981 and transmitted it to the Senate for advise and consent on Sept. 21, 1983. See
Letter of Transmittal, Sept. 21, 1983, Senate Treaty Document No. 98-9, Message from
the President of the United States Transmitting the United Nations Convention on Con-
tracts for the International Sale of Goods, Adopted by a United Nations Conference of
Sixty-Two States on April 11, 1980 [hereinafter "Letter of Transmittal"].
30. See State Department Notices - 1987, Public Notice 1004. 52 Fed. Reg. 40
(1987).
31. See CISG, supra note 1, art. 99(1).
32. See 52 Fed. Reg. 232 (1987).
33. See id. The eleven countries were Argentina, China, Egypt, France, Hungary,
Italy, Lesotho, Syria, the United States, Yugoslavia and Zambia.
34. A total of 54 nations have signed the CISG: Argentina, Australia, Austria,
Belarus, Belgium, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Burundi, Canada, Chile, China (PRC),
Croatia, Cuba, Czech Republic, Denmark, Ecuador, Egypt, Estonia, Finland, France,
Georgia, Germany, Greece, Guinea, Hungary, Iraq, Italy, Latvia, Lesotho, Lithuania,
Luxembourg, Mexico, Moldova, Mongolia, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland,
Romania, Russian Federation, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland,
Syria, Uganda, Ukraine, United States, Uruguay, Uzbekistan, Yugoslavia, and Zambia.
35. See Kevin Bell, The Sphere of Application of the Vienna Convention on Contracts for
the International Sale of Goods, 8 PACE Ir'rL L. Rav. 237, 237 (1996).
36. For example, in 1994, with only 45 signatories, the CISG accounted for almost
two-thirds of all world imports and exports of goods. See International Monetary Fund,
Direction of Trade Statistics Yearbook 2-9 (1995). See also Pace University School of
Law, Pace Law Library, and the Institute of International Commercial Law website (vis-
ited July 20, 1999) <www.cisg.law.pace.edu/index2.html> [hereinafter the Pace website].
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II. The CISG's Nature As a Self-Executing Treaty Prevents Uniformity
A. Introduction
Despite the CISG's applicability to every international contract for the sale
of goods in North America 3 7 as well as for most contracts involving the
major trading partners of the United States, 38 many U.S. businesses, law-
yers and courts have yet to realize that contracts they assume are governed
by the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) 3 9 are actually governed by the
CISG. The dearth of U.S. case law concerning the CISG despite its ten
years of applicability to the majority of U.S. international sales transactions
is itself evidence of the lack of awareness of the CISG in the United States
- to date, only fifteen federal court opinions and two state court opinions
have cited the CISG.40 While other reasons may contribute to this lack of
awareness, 4 1 the treaty's character under U.S. law as a self-executing treaty
is probably the main reason U.S. parties are unaware of its existence.
37. See supra text accompanying note 5.
38. See supra text accompanying note 6.
39. See 1 RONALD A. ANDERSON, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 1-101:61 (3d ed.
1996). See also CISG, supra note 1.
40. See Attorneys Trust v. Videotape Computer Products, Inc., 94 F.3d 650 (9th Cir.
1996) (unpublished opinion); Delchi Carrier S.P.A. v. Rotorex Corp., 71 F.3d 1024 (2d
Cir. 1995); Beijing Metals & Minerals Import/Export Corp. v. American Business
Center, Inc., 993 F.2d 1178 (5th Cir. 1993); Claudia v. Olivieri Footware Ltd., 1998 WL
164824 (S.D.N.Y. 1998); MCC-Marble Ceramic Center, Inc. v. Ceramica Nuova
D'Agostino, S.P.A., 1998 WL 343335 (11th Cir. 1998); Helen Kaminski Pty. Ltd. v. Mar-
keting Australian Products, Inc., 1997 WL 414137 (S.D.N.Y. 1997); Kahn Lucas Lancas-
ter, Inc. v. Lark Int'l Ltd., 1997 WL 458785 (S.D.N.Y. 1997); Huntington Int'l Corp. v.
Armstrong World Indus., 981 F. Supp. 134 (E.D.N.Y. 1997); Delchi Carrier v. Rotorex
Corp., 1994 WL 495787 (N.D.N.Y. 1994); Graves Import Co., Ltd. v. Chilewich Int'l
Corp., 1994 WL 519996 (S.D.N.Y. 1994); S.V. Braun, Inc. v. Alitalia-Linee Italiane
S.P.A., 1994 WL 121680 (S.D.N.Y. 1994); Filanto S.P.A. v. Chilewich Int'l Corp., 789 F.
Supp. 1229 (S.D.N.Y. 1992); Interag Co. Ltd., 1990 WL 71478 (S.D.N.Y. 1990); Orbi-
sphere Corp. v. United States, 726 F. Supp. 1344 (C.I.T. 1989); GPL Treatment, Ltd. v.
Louisiana-Pacific Corp., 894 P.2d 470 (Or. App. Ct. 1994), affid, 914 P.2d 682 (Or.
1996); Promaulayko v. Amtorg Trading Corp., 540 A.2d 893 (NJ. Super. 1988).
See infra note 41 and text accompanying notes 58 to 72. As one author has explained:
there are other reasons that may account for the under-utilization of the Conven-
tion, such as the bargaining power of one of the parties to an international sales
transaction to demand application of its own national laws or failure of counsel
to raise the issue of application of the Convention at trial.
V. Susanne Cook, Recent Development Relating to CISG: The U.N. Convention on Con-
tracts for the International Sale of Goods: A Mandate to Abandon Legal Ethnocentricity, 16
J.L. & COM. 257, 258, n.5 (1997).
Nevertheless, as the court observed in Filanto, 789 F. Supp. at 1237,
there is as yet virtually no U.S. case law interpreting the Sale of Goods Conven-
tion . . . [However,] it may safely be predicted that this will change because
absent a choice-of-law provision, and with certain exclusions not here relevant,
the Convention governs all contracts between parties with places of business in
different nations, so long as both nations are signatories to the Convention.
See also CISG, supra note 1, art. 1(1)(a).
41. The CISG receives little or no coverage in secondary legal sources. As one com-
mentator has observed:
Even though its member states nearly quadrupled [within 8 years of its entry
into force], its international bibliography reached well over 200 pages, and its
commentaries in many languages abound, one may still come across elaborate
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Hence, as it currently exists under U.S. law, the CISG does not bring uni-
formity to the law of international sales but instead fosters disharmony
based on ignorance.42
B. The Nature of the CISG as a Self-Executing Treaty
Under U.S. law treaties are either self-executing or non-self-executing. 43
Non-self-executing treaties require corresponding federal legislation before
they will be binding on U.S. citizens.44 Self-executing treaties do not
require additional federal legislation, and therefore become binding as U.S.
law upon completion of the ratification process. 45 Unless the treaty
expressly calls for legislative implementation or the subject matter is within
the exclusive jurisdiction of Congress, the question of whether a treaty is
self-executing is a question left to judicial determination.46 In making this
determination, courts must examine the intent of the parties as manifested
within the language of the treaty. The CISG has been recognized by U.S.
courts and numerous commentators as a self-executing treaty.47
The conclusion that the CISG is self-executing is supported by two
aspects of the treaty: legislative history and subject matter.48 During the
sixth session of the UNCITRAL Working Group charged with drafting what
would become the CISG, the Working Group decided that the treaty should
be drafted so that the provisions would be applicable to international sales
contracts without the need of parallel domestic legislation.49 Therefore, to
speed implementation and acceptance, the negotiating parties (which
treatises on International Sales Law which either do not mention CISG at all or
limit themselves to a few lines of reference.
MICHAEL R. WILL, CISG THE UN CONVENTION ON CoNTRACTS FOR THE INTERNATIONAL SALE
OF GOODS: INTERNATIONAL BIBLIOGRAPHY, 1980-1995; THE FIRST 150 OR So DECISIONS 241
(1995) (footnotes omitted). See also DAVID ZASLOWSKY & LAURENCE W. NEWMAN, LITIGAT-
ING INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL DISPUTES (1996) (which does not even mention the
CISG) and RALPH FOLSOM ET AL., INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS: A PROBLEM ORI-
ENTED CASEBOOK (3d ed. 1995) (spending less than seven out of 1259 pages on the
CISG).
42. See infra text accompanying notes 55-60 which discusses Attorneys Trust as an
illustration of the problems posed by the CISG's obscure existence under U.S. law.
43. See Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190, 194 (1888).
44. See id. (stating that "[i]f the treaty contains stipulations which are self-executing,
that is, require no legislation to make them operative, to that extent they have the force
and effect of a legislative enactment.").
45. See id.
46. See British Caledonia Airways, Ltd. v. Bond, 214 U.S. App. D.C. 335; 665 F.2d
1153, 1160 (1976). See also United States v. Postal, 589 F.2d 862, 877 (5th Cir. 1979).
47. See Delchi Carrier, 71 F.3d at 1027 (2d Cir. 1995) (stating that "[tihe
CISG ... [is] a self-executing agreement..."); Filanto, 789 F. Supp. at 1237 (S.D.N.Y.
1992). See, e.g., Richard E. Speidel, The Revision of UCC Article 2, Sales in Light of the
United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, 16 Nw.J. INT'L
L. & Bus. 165, 166 (1995) (stating that "[i]n the United States, [the CISG] is a self-
executing treaty with the preemptive force of federal law.").
48. Diggs v. Richardson, 555 F.2d 848, 851 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (stating that "[i]n deter-
mining whether a treaty is self-executing courts look to the intent of the signatory par-
ties as manifested by the language of the instrument, and, if the instrument is uncertain,
recourse must be had to the circumstances surrounding its execution.").
49. See Sono, supra note 12, at 4.
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included the United States) drafted the CISG to be a self-executing treaty.50
The subject matter of the treaty also reveals its nature as a self-execut-
ing treaty. With the exception of a few routine diplomatic aspects
addressed in the final articles of the treaty,5 1 the CISG's focus is devoted
entirely to the substantive law regulating the sale of goods between private
parties. This characteristic is typical of self-executing treaties. 52 Moreover,
unlike a non-self-executing treaty, the CISG does not alter or affect the rela-
tionships among the signatory nations in their capacity as sovereign
nations.
C. The Problem Created by the Self-Executing Nature of the CISG
Unfortunately, the nature of the CISG as a self-executing treaty interferes
with uniform recognition and application of the treaty in the United States
because self-executing treaties do not become law in the way that other
federal legislation becomes law. Typically, after the President signs a bill
that has been passed by both the House and Senate, that law is placed
within the appropriate title of U.S. Code and each of its parts is given a
section number. This numeration system, and the inclusion of the legisla-
tion in the U.S. Code indices, enables courts and lawyers to easily locate
the law in question. As a self-executing treaty, however, the CISG needed
only Senate ratification to become applicable within the United States.
Therefore, the CISG became federal law without any changes, without the
addition of individual section numbers, and without being included in the
various indices to the U.S. Code.5 3 Essentially, the CISG was simply
dumped, without introduction or comment, into the Appendix to Title 15
of the U.S. Code.5 4 The effect is that one cannot find the CISG in the U.S.
Code unless one already knows it exists and where it is located. Further,
50. See Paul Volken, The Vienna Convention: Scope, Interpretation and Gap-Filling, in
INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODs; DUBROVNIK LEcTURES, 21 (Peter Sarcevic & Paul Volken
eds., 1986) (stating that "[t]he rules of the Vienna Convention are clearly self-
executing.").
51. CISG Articles 89-101 address matters such as accession, ratification, declaration
of reservations, and denunciation of the treaty. See CISG, supra note 1, arts. 89-101.
Such issues are routinely included in modern treaties, regardless of the subject matter of
the treaty as a whole.
52. See United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 939 F.2d 1341, 1358, n. 17 (9th Cir.
1991) (stating that "[a] self-executing treaty is one which, of its own force, confers rights
on individuals, without the need for any implementing legislation."). See also Breard v.
Pruitt, 134 F.3d 615, 622 (4th Cir. 1998) (stating that "[t]he Vienna Convention is a self
executing treaty - it provides rights to individuals rather than merely setting out the
obligations of signatories.").
53. Article 93 of the CISG allows nations with political subdivisions to submit the
CISG to those subdivisions for piecemeal acceptance. See CISG, supra note 1, art. 93.
Canada, for example, chose this approach and its provinces individually acceded to the
CISG. Although the United States was similarly free to submit the CISG for independent
approval by each state, the Senate chose to commit the United States as a whole.
54. See Richard E. Speidel, The Impact of Internationalization of Transnational Com-
mercial Law: The Revision of UCC Article 2, Sales in Light of the United Nations Conven-
tion on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, 16J. INT'L L. & Bus. 165, 167 (1995)
(stating that "Congress did not enact legislation to implement CISG and made no provi-
sion for coordination with the domestic law of sales.").
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since none of the provisions of the CISG are contained in the indices to the
U.S. Code, the individual subjects regulated by the CISG cannot be discov-
ered through traditional legal research methods.
If one does not already know of the CISG, the only way to find the
CISG in the U.S. Code is with a computer search. However, merely locat-
ing the treaty does not completely reveal its importance because the CISG
itself does not state that it is a self-executing treaty. Thus, even if a party
locates the CISG within the U.S. Code, not even the most careful reading of
the treaty will reveal that the treaty is U.S. law potentially applicable to
international sales contracts involving U.S. parties. This problem is illus-
trated by the case of Attorneys Trust v. Videotape Computer Products, Inc.
55
Attorneys Trust involved a dispute over a sales contract between a U.S.
party and a Taiwanese party. The basis for the dispute is unimportant;
what is important is how the attorneys and the 9th Circuit Court of
Appeals fumbled with the issue of whether the dispute should be governed
by the CISG. On appeal, counsel for. the Taiwanese party asserted for the
first time that the CISG governed the dispute. The 9th Circuit rejected this
claim, stating that according to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 44.1, it was
too late to raise the issue of foreign law and that the law of the forum,
California, applied.5 6 In making this ruling, the court revealed its total
ignorance of the CISG: the CISG is U.S. law, not foreign law.57 Further,
application of the CISG would not have led to the application of Taiwanese
law as the court believed counsel had suggested. 58 Fortuitously, no harm
resulted from the court's ignorance. Since Taiwan has not ratified the
CISG, counsel for the Taiwanese party was incorrect in asserting that the
CISG governed the dispute.59 Thus, despite its ignorance of the CISG as
U.S. law, the 9th Circuit reached the correct result (that the CISG did not
apply to the dispute) for completely incorrect reasons.60
55. See Attorneys Trust v. Videotape Computer Products, Inc. 94 F.3d 650 (9th Cir.
1996) (unpublished opinion).
56. See id. at 650.
57. As U.S. law, the CISG is also California law. See infra text accompanying notes
61-64.
58. See Attorneys Trust, 94 F.3d at 650 (stating that "CMC's final attempt to avoid
the district court's judgment consists of its assertion that the district court erred
because it should have applied the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the
International Sale of Goods. That would have led to the application of the law of Taiwan
to this case, says CMC. However, this claim is too little too late. Assuming that Taiwan
is a party to the Convention, '[a] party who intends to raise an issue concerning the law
of a foreign country shall give notice by pleadings or other reasonable written notice.'
Fed. L Civ. P. 44.1. The failure to raise the issue results in application of the law of the
forum, here California.")
59. This error by the attorneys is not surprising given that the CISG is often over-
looked in publications written by and for U.S. lawyers. See, e.g., ZASLowsKY & NEviNAN,
supra note 41 (failing to even mention the CISG).
60. The analysis should have been as follows: according to U.S. law, made applica-
ble to the individual states by the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution,
the CISG applies to all contracts for the sale of goods between parties located in the
United States and parties located in nations which have also ratified the CISG. Since
Taiwan has not ratified the CISG, the CISG does not govern this transaction.
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The inability to identify the treaty as U.S. law drastically reduces the
likelihood that courts and lawyers will be able to apply it as intended, as a
uniform law. The problem is exacerbated by the fact that, as a treaty, the
CISG is the legal equivalent of federal legislation. 61 Hence, by virtue of the
Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution,62 the CISG preempts all con-
flicting state laws,63 and all U.S. courts must apply the CISG to issues
raised by international sales contracts covered by the CISG. Thus, the
CISG supplants the UCC throughout the United States. Since no provision
in the treaty identifies the treaty as self-executing and since the treaty is not
easily located within the U.S. Code, this uniform law which preempts the
UCC in the area of international sales6 4 remains both hidden and
unknown to courts and practitioners.
Unfortunately, one cannot treat the problem of the CISG's cloistered
existence in the U.S. Code as one that will be eventually remedied as word
of the law spreads. As a treaty, the CISG is equal in authority to federal
law.65 Changing federal law embodied in a treaty requires the United
States either to formally repudiate the treaty66 or pass subsequent federal
legislation which directly conflicts with the treaty's provisions. If subse-
quent federal legislation unavoidably conflicts with the law embodied in a
treaty, the subsequent federal law supersedes the provisions of the treaty as
the most recent expression of the legislative will of the United States.67
However, by virtue of the treaty's existence outside of the regular sequenc-
ing of the U.S. Code, it is difficult to know when, if ever, federal legislation
conflicts with the CISG. Legislators could easily be unaware that a pend-
61. See supra notes 43-47.
62. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
This Constitution and the Laws of the United Sates which shall be made in
Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the
Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the
Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or
Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.
Id.
63. See Filanto, 789 F. Supp. at 1237.
64. The CISG is a detailed set of rules governing numerous aspects of international
sales contracts involving U.S. parties including formation of contracts, the obligations of
buyer and seller, the passage of risk, and remedies available to both parties in case of
breach of contract. See generally CISG, supra note 1.
65. See supra note 43-47.
66. Article 101 of the CISG allows parties to remove themselves from coverage of the
treaty. However, since the United States was the most influential party during the
Vienna Convention negotiations, and obtained numerous concessions in the final text, it
seems highly unlikely that the United States will repudiate the CISG any time soon.
67. See Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 18 (1957) (stating that "when a statute which is
subsequent in time is inconsistent with a treaty, the statute to the extent of the conflict
renders the treaty null."); Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 602 (1889)
(holding that an existing treaty is superseded by subsequent federal law in the event of
conflict); Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190, 194 (1888) (holding that "[bly the Con-
stitution a treaty is placed on the same footing.., with an act of legislation ... [Blut if
the two are inconsistent, the one last in date will control the other, provided always the
stipulation of the treaty ... is self-executing.").
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ing bill is in conflict with the CISG as would courts later called on to apply
the CISG.
This problem is particularly acute when one attempts to discern the
effects of future legislation which fails to amend the CISG by direct refer-
ence. For example, as of this date, there has been no definitive resolution
under U.S. law of whether software is a "good" and therefore covered by the
UCC.68 If a significant divergence among U.S. courts develops on this
issue, Congress may decide to resolve the conflict by passing legislation
declaring software to be a "good" for purposes of the UCC. Application of
the "last in time" doctrine would mean that any such federal legislation on
software would supersede the CISG in case of conflict. This would raise
the question of whether, by declaring software to be a good, Congress
intended international software sales to be covered by the UCC rather than
the CISG. The goal of the CISG, uniformity of application and result with
regard to international sales law, is hardly likely to be achieved in this
situation.
The United States may apply the CISG in a manner consistent with
other nations in order to achieve a unified international sales law. In this
respect, the sales law of the several states must be made to conform to the
CISG. This can only be achieved by federal legislation implementing the
CISG.
In the past, the United States has used federal legislation as an effec-
tive remedy to the problems of implementation associated with self-execut-
ing treaties. Such parallel legislation has the advantages of increasing
public and judicial awareness of the agreement, reducing the potential for
inadvertent conflict with future legislation, and compelling consistent
application of the agreement by the several states. For example, Congress
passed the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act as a separate federal law embody-
ing the Hague Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to
Bills of Lading. Complex agreements such as the Canadian Free Trade Act
(CFTA),69 the North American Free Trade Act (NAFTA),70 and the U.S.
commitment to the World Trade Organization (WTO) 7 1 have been accom-
panied by domestic legislation,7 2 and all three are part of the U.S. Code.73
68. See, e.g., Micro Data Base Sys., Inc. v. Dharma Sys., Inc., 148 F.3d 649, 654 (7th
Cir 1998) (pointing out, in resolving a choice of law question, that the only case to
address the issue in Indiana held that software is a service, while the only case to
address the issue in New Hampshire held that it is a good); Advent Sys. Ltd. v. Unisys
Corp., 925 F.2d 670, 672 (3d Cir. 1991) (holding that "computer software is a good
within the Uniform Commercial Code.")
69. See United States-Canada Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 22, 1987 -Jan. 2, 1988,
U.S.-Can., 27 I.L.M. 281 (1988) [hereinafter CFTA].
70. See 19 U.S.C. §§ 3301-3473 (1998).
71. See 19 U.S.C. § 3501(9) (1998).
72. To avoid the difficulties attendant with enacting the CFTA, NAFTA, and WTO
into separate federal legislation without amendment, the United States negotiated all
three treaties under fast-track negotiating authority granted to the President by the
House and Senate. Generally speaking, fast-track authority allows the President to nego-
tiate a treaty and submit it to the House and Senate for approval based on a majority vote
without the possibility of amendment. Rather than subject a detailed trade treaty to Con-
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The CISG would similarly benefit from parallel federal legislation.
The CISG has spent the last decade buried in the Appendix to Title 15. As
a result, courts have inconsistently applied the CISG, particularly where it
supplants the international sales provision of the UCC. New federal legis-
lation would bring the broad provisions of the CISG into the view of the
courts, and provide a basis for the unification of international sales law.74
III. The Elusive Principles of Interpretation of the CISG
A. Introduction
The CISG will not achieve its goal of uniformity in international sales law
unless it incorporates more effective principles of interpretation. The prin-
ciples of interpretation currently incorporated in the CISG have failed to
guide independent national courts to a consistent interpretation of the
treaty.
Article 7 contains four principles for interpreting the provisions of the
Convention:75 (1) consideration of the Convention's international charac-
ter,76 (2) the Convention's need for uniformity,7 7 (3) observation of good
faith in interpreting the Convention,78 and (4) the use of the Convention's
implicit general principles to address matters not explicitly covered by the
gressional approval after negotiations, the House and Senate are allowed to provide feed-
back to the U.S. Trade Representative during the negotiation process. For a general
discussion of the fast-track negotiating process, see generally Frederick M. Abbott, Foun-
dation - Building for Western Hemisphere Integration, 17 Nw. J. INr'L L. & Bus. 900, 930
n.63 (1996-97); Lisa Anderson, Comment, The Future of Hemispheric Free Trade:
Towards a Unified Hemisphere?, 20 Hous. J. Ir'L L. 635, 648 (1998).
73. NAFTA is currently located in 19 U.S.C. §3301-3473 (1998). The rules of GATT
and the WTO are located in 15 U.S.C. § 1052, 17 U.S.C. § 104A, 19 U.S.C. §§ 1671b,
1675, 1675b, 1677, 2702, 2905, 3111, 3202, 3501(9), 3511, 3521, 3522, 3531, 3532,
3533, 3534, 3535, 3551, 3591, 3602, 3622, 3623 (1998).
74. See Hearing before the Committee on Foreign Relations on Treaty Doc. 98-9,
98th Cong., Comments of Mr. Frank A Orban, III, in 1 GUIDE TO THE INTERNATIONAL SALE
OF GOODS CONVENTION (44), 303.74 (1997).
Although [having the individual U.S. states separately enact the Conven-
tion] ... would have the benefit of bringing the Convention before the general
American business community from coast to coast, it is probably inefficient.
Implementing legislation passed by both Houses of Congress, which repeated
the text of the Convention, would probably serve the same educational purpose
and be politically more desirable as well as quick.
Id.
75. CISG art. 7 states in toto:
(1) In the interpretation of this Convention, regard is to be had to its interna-
tional character and to the need to promote uniformity in its application and the
observance of good faith in international trade.
(2) Questions concerning matters governed by this Convention which are not
expressly settled in it are to be settled in conformity with the general principles
on which it is based or, in the absence of such principles, in conformity with the
law applicable by virtue of the rules of private international law.
CISG, supra note 1, art. 7.
76. The first part of paragraph (1) of Article 7 contains this criterion. See id.
77. See id.
78. The concluding words of paragraph (1) of Article 7 contain this criterion. See id.
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Convention. 79 Moreover, these provisions also establish a specific hierar-
chy for interpretation of the Convention: if the explicit provisions of the
CISG do not provide an answer, a court is to look for guidance from the
CISG's unstated general principles. If no answer is found there, a court
must turn to domestic law rules "applicable by virtue of the rules of private
international law [i.e., the result of a choice of law analysis]."80
Unfortunately, the principles of interpretation articulated in Article 7
are vague and difficult to apply. While Article 7 requires that the CISG be
interpreted according to "independent international principles" 8l in order
to achieve uniform results,8 2 it does not adequately explain what those
principles mean.
B. Interpreting the Convention According to Its "International
Character"
Discerning the meaning of Article 7's command to interpret the Conven-
tion according to its "international character" requires tracing the phrase to
its origins in the ULIS.8 3 Articles 2 and 17 of the ULIS greatly influenced
the Working Group in drafting Article 7 of the CISG. In particular, Article
2 of the ULIS states that "[r]ules of private international law [and the
domestic laws resulting therefrom] shall be excluded for the purpose of the
application of the present Law .... -84 and ULIS Article 17 states that
"[q]uestions concerning matters governed by this Law which are not
expressly settled in it are to be settled in conformity with the general prin-
ciples on which the present Law is based."85 The nations which negotiated
the ULIS intended these two provisions to create a self-contained law of
sales interpreted and applied without reference to national laws.8 6
National representatives to the CISG negotiations proposed various modifi-
cations,8 7 but ultimately the Working Group settled on a revision which
eventually became the first part of CISG Article 7: "In the interpretation
and application of the provisions of this Convention, regard is to be had to
its international character and to the need to promote uniformity."88 Thus,
79. Paragraph (2) of Article 7 contains this criterion. See id.
80. Id. art. 7(2).
81. Id. art. 7(1).
82. See id.
83. See supra text accompanying notes 11-15.
84. ULIS, supra note 14, art. 2. The term "private international law" used in ULIS
article 2 refers to the rules of choice of law. Application of choice of law rules would
lead to the application of domestic laws to an international sales contract. Hence, the
reason why the ULIS and the CISG exclude them, albeit with different wording.
85. Id. art. 17.
86. See MichaelJ. Bonell, Article 7, in COMMENTARY ON THE INTERNATIONAL SALEs LAW,
THE VIENNA SALES CONVENTION 65 (Milan 1987).
87. These modifications included: redrafting ULIS Article 17 to emphasize interpre-
tation of the Convention to foster uniformity in the law of international sales, deleting
the provision altogether, expressly stating the contrary position (that domestic laws
indicated by private international law would be used in situations not specifically cov-
ered by the Convention), and combining these suggestions so that domestic laws indi-
cated by private international law would be used only as a last resort. See id. at 67.
88. See id.
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the legislative history of Article 7 reveals that the drafters included the
directive to interpret the Convention according to its "international charac-
ter" to direct courts to treat the CISG as an autonomous body of law rather
than as a place on which to graft their domestic rules and traditions.8 9
The restriction on national courts contained in Article 7 is based on
sound reasoning: all legislation, whether created at the domestic or inter-
national level, eventually requires interpretation because no legislation can
anticipate all the situations in which it might be applied. This poses partic-
ular problems for international legislation, for unlike domestic systems in
which a court can base its decision on established jurisprudence, an
instrument created at an international level lacks an established legal tradi-
tion.90 Article 7(1) therefore establishes that a court is to interpret the
CISG not as a purely domestic law but as a unique set of rules which is
neither grounded in any one legal tradition nor subject to unifying interpre-
tation by a single high court.9 1
The principle of interpreting the CISG according to its "international
character" contained in Article 7(1) poses a challenge for U.S. courts which
approach the Convention from the case law-based tradition of the common
law rather than the code-based tradition of the civil law.92 The Second
Circuit's decision in Delchi Carrier SPA v. Rotorex Corp.93 is an excellent
example of the errors that result from the failure to interpret and apply the
Convention as an international, rather than a domestic, body of law. In
Delchi, a foreign buyer sought damages under the CISG for the seller's
delivery of non-conforming goods. The first paragraph of the Delchi
court's legal analysis demonstrates the differences in approach between the
common law background of the court and the civil law perspective of the
CISG. Although the Second Circuit recognized that the CISG governed the
dispute,9 4 the court stated: "Because there is sparse case law under the
Convention, we look to its language and to 'the general principles' upon
which it is based."'95 This conclusion, which appears to be a routine
description of standard common law analysis, contains several errors with
respect to the Convention.
First, only if no case law existed in the United States would the court's
89. See id. at 72-73. See also Lisa M. Ryan, The Convention on Contracts for the Inter-
national Sale of Goods: Divergent Interpretations, 4 TUL. J. INT'L & CoMp. L. 99, 100
(1995). See also Kastely, Unification and Community: A Rhetorical Analysis of the United
Nations Convention, 8 Nw J. INT'L L. & Bus. 601-02 (1988) (concluding that Article 7
requires courts to interpret the CISG "not merely as a part of their own law, but also as a
text that is shared by an international community and is the basis for international
deliberation . . ").
90. See Bonell, supra note 86, at 65.
91. See id.
92. See, e.g., Volken, supra note 50, at 39-40, which points out differences between
the common law and civil law approaches to statutory interpretation.
93. 71 F.3d 1024 (2d Cir. 1995).
94. See id. at 1027.
95. Id. at 1027-28 (citing CISG art. 7(2)).
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conclusion be factually correct,9 6 for at the time of the Delchi case foreign
jurisdictions had rendered over 20097 readily accessible98 reported deci-
sions.99 Second, by referring only to U.S. jurisprudence, the court com-
mitted a serious legal error because Article 7(1) requires courts to examine
all CISG case law without restriction to any one nation's courts.10 0 The
Delchi court committed an even more egregious error, though, when it also
stated that "case law interpreting analogous provisions of Article 2 of the
UCC may also inform a court where the language of the relevant CISG
provisions track that of the UCC."'10 1 One other U.S. court has made the
same mistake. In Kahn Lucas Lancaster, Inc v. Lark Int'l Ltd., the U.S. Dis-
trict Court for the Southern District of New York declared: "Even if the
Sale of Goods Convention were applicable, it would very likely lead to the
same result reached below, insofar as its provision regarding acceptance by
performance is similar to the Uniform Commercial Code adopted in New
York." 102 As one commentator has accurately pointed out, the approach of
both Delchi and Kahn Lucas is flawed: "Although the UCC has greatly
influenced the CISG, it is impossible and even perilous to assert that the
aforementioned sets of rules are similar in content, or, even worse, that they
are 'sufficiently compatible to support claims of overall consistency."
1 °3
Indeed, the approach described in Delchi and Kahn Lucas is precisely con-
trary to the application intended by the drafters of the CISG: national
courts are not to analogize the CISG to their own national laws until after
96. As of this writing, only 17 U.S. court opinions have mentioned the CISG. See
supra note 40.
97. See the Pace website, supra note 36; the UNCITRAL website (visited July 20,
1999) <http://www.un.or.at/uncitral/>. Domestic and international case law regarding
the CISG is available at the Pace website; summaries of and cites to every CISG case from
other nations are available at the UNCITRAL website. Both websites are very easy to use,
with detailed instructions on how to locate and access their materials.
98. The Pace website has been up since November 30, 1995 and UNCITRAL has
been reporting cases since the CISG entered into force in 1988. E-mail from David Wil-
liams, Webmaster for Pace website (July 8, 1998) (on file with author). The Pace website
was announced in 1996 at two conferences: the first in Vienna in March, the second in
New York in April. Email from Prof. Albert Kritzer, Pace University School of Law (July
8, 1998) (on file with author).
99. The Delchi court's error in this regard is not unusual for U.S. courts. See Clau-
dia, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4586, at *13, Helen Kaminski, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10630,
at *3, Filanto, 789 F. Supp. at 1237.
100. See HONNOLD, supra note 20, at 120 (stating that "[t]he Convention's require-
ment of regard for 'uniformity in its application' calls for tribunals to consider interpre-
tations of the Convention established in other countries."). See also V. Susanne Cook,
The U.N. Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods: A Mandate to Aban-
don Legal Ethnocentricity, 16 J.L. & CoM. 257, 261 (1997) (criticizing the Delchi court
because it "proceeded in its analysis in much the same manner as if it had been inter-
preting the Uniform Commercial Code or any other purely domestic statute. For gui-
dance, it consulted exclusively U.S. decisions and U.S. commentators. In its approach,
no international trace, such as non-U.S. sources or methods of analysis, can be found
anywhere."). See also text accompanying infra notes 141 to 165.
101. Delchi, 71 F.3d at 1028.
102. Kahn Lucas, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11916, at 16 n.8 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
103. Franco Ferrari, Is the OCC Dead or Alive and Well? International Perspective: The
Relationship Between the UCC and the CISG and the Construction of Uniform Law, 29 Loy.
L.A. L. REv. 1021, 1023 (1996).
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they have exhaustively examined the language of the Convention. 10 4
Examination of the Convention in order to interpret it according to its
international character, however, poses the problem of finding guidance in
making such an interpretation. Although an official commentary to the
CISG would be helpful in this regard, none exists.10 5 Instead, interpreting
the Convention according to its international character requires considera-
tion of decisions of tribunals from other jurisdictions, 10 6 the legislative his-
tory of the Convention' 0 7 (as found in the records of its drafts and
negotiations' 0 8) and the Secretariat Commentaries to the 1978 Draft of the
Convention.' 0 9 Further, the body of law applying the Convention has been
slowly building over the past two decades and can be found in various
forms in several sources. 110 In those areas where the Secretariat Commen-
taries are silent or too brief, the traveaux preparatoires, or legislative his-
tory, can be discerned through comparison to the 1978 draft of the
104. See Bernard Audit, The Vienna Sales Convention and the Lex Mercatoria, in LEx
MERCATORIA AND ARBITRATION (Carbonneau ed., 1998) (stressing that "[even if] a Conven-
tion rule is directly inspired by domestic law ... the court should not fall back on its
domestic law, but interpret the rule by reference to the Convention."). Id. at 188(emphasis added). See also John 0. Honnold, The Sales Convention in Action - Uniform
International Words: Uniform Application?, 8 J.L. & COM. 207, 208 (1988) and Ferrari,
supra note 103, at 1024-26.
As explained below, analysis of the provisions of the CISG often requires considera-
tion of foreign (and domestic) cases which discuss the CISG. See infra text accompany-
ing notes 125-29.
105. The closest counterpart to an Official Commentary is the Secretariat Commenta-
ries to the 1978 Draft prepared by the Secretariat of the United Nations. See infra text
accompanying note 116.
106. Most commentators discuss consultation of foreign cases as part of the "interna-
tionality" requirement. See, e.g., HONNOLD, supra note 20, at 114; Albert H. Kritzer,
GUIDE TO PRACTICAL APPLICATIONS OF THE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON CONTRACTS
FOR THE INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS, 108-09 (1989). However, this article treats the
need to examine foreign case law as an element of Article 7's second principle, the need
for uniformity. The reason for this distinction is that although staying true to the "inter-
national character" of the CISG will often result in examination of foreign case law for
guidance to determine the meaning of a particular provision, the precise role foreign
case law should play and the degree of authority with which it should be considered is
more properly treated as an aspect of the Convention's uniformity principle. See infra
text accompanying notes 125-29.
107. See HONNOLD, supra note 20, at 114.
108. The documents of the 1980 Sales Conference which resulted in the CISG all bear
the standard U.N. method of designation. For example, the designation "A/CONF.97/
C.1/SR.1" indicates that this document refers to the first summary record (SR.1) of the
First Committee (C.1) of the ninety-seventh conference called by the United Nations
General Assembly (A/CONF.97). See id. at 38-39.
109. Although these Commentaries can be frustratingly brief, they are useful in
researching the legislative history of the Convention. However, the parties to the Final
Act did not adopt them as part of the Convention. Hence, the Commentaries do not refer
directly to the CISG but to the articles as they appeared in the 1978 draft of the
Convention.
110. The Journal of Law & Commerce provides translations of selected foreign CISG
cases. UNCITRAL provides summaries of all foreign cases on the CISG at the Case Law
on UNCITRAL Texts (CLOUT) website (visited July 20, 1999) <http://www.un.or.at/
uncitral/en-index.htm>. The Pace website, supra note 36, provides UNCITRAL summa-
ries as well as commentary on most U.S. CISG cases.
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Convention,"' comparison to the 1964 Hague Conventions 1 2 on the
same subjects and the various accounts of the CISG negotiations. 1 3 Also,
since the Convention exists in six official languages," 4 reference to the
wording of the other five official texts is appropriate and potentially use-
ful.115 Finally, the Secretariat Commentaries to the 1978 draft should pro-
vide a court with some guidance in interpreting the Convention since they
have been described as "perhaps the most authoritative citations to the
meaning of the Convention [short of an Official Commentary]."" 6 Ulti-
mately, though, courts are left on their own in determining both how to
best interpret the command in Article 7(1) to interpret the CISG according
to its "international character" and how to apply that principle.
As the Delchi and Lucas Kahn decisions demonstrate, requiring U.S.
courts to abandon the traditional common law approach and examine the
Convention's provisions ahead of analogous U.S. law is problematic. Since
interpreting the CISG according to its "international character" is essential
to the creation of a unified jurisprudence for the CISG, successful applica-
tion of that approach in any nation mandates that this principle be dearly
enunciated.'1 7 Unfortunately, the most Article 7 does is to vaguely
announce the principle, leaving courts to divine its meaning. Without an
explicit explanation of how to implement the command to interpret the
Convention according to its international character, Article 7 fosters incon-
sistency because some courts will be more zealous than others in their rec-
ognition of the Convention's international character." 8
111. See Commentary on the Draft Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of
Goods, in UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON CONTRACTS FOR THE INTERNATIONAL SALE OF
GOODS, OFFICIAL RECORDS A/CONF.97/5, 14 (1980) (reproducing the 1978 Draft).
112. See supra text accompanying notes 20 and 21.
113. See, e.g., Kritzer, supra note 106.
114. See penultimate paragraph of CISG, supra note 1: "Done at Vienna... in a single
original, of which the Arabic, Chinese, English, French, Russian and Spanish texts are
equally authentic."
115. See Volken, supra note 50, at 41 (stating that "sincere efforts towards achieving
uniform application of the Vienna Convention may require consulting its texts not only
in one but several official languages."). The CISG offers no guidance as to when a court
should refer to the various official texts in interpreting the CISG. Since the penultimate
paragraph of the CISG declares that all versions are equally authentic, a comparison of
the various linguistic nuances in the different texts would seem appropriate if the text is
unclear the linguistic version adopted in that country. While it may be too much to
expect a court sitting in a country which speaks one of the official languages to defer to
a version of the CISG written in another official language, courts located in nations
which speak a language other than one of the official languages routinely face this
problem.
116. See Kritzer, supra note 106, at 2.
117. This is particularly true for a nation with a common law tradition.
118. For example, nations within the European Union have been referring to legal
activities and judicial opinions in other EU nations for decades. The requirement that
courts refer to the decisions of foreign courts has not been received as a novel concept.
Thus far, the requirement of Article 7 to examine foreign case law has yet to be embraced
by any U.S. court.
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C. The Need to Promote Uniformity in Application
Allowing national courts to apply their own established jurisprudence to
the Convention would have provided an easily applied mechanism for
interpretation of the CISG. However, this approach would have created two
new problems: (1) ready application of domestic legal principles would
likely preclude much application of the uniform law itself, thereby defeat-
ing the purpose of enacting the uniform law, and (2) application of various
domestic principles would not lead to uniform interpretation or applica-
tion of the Convention. To avoid the inconsistency and uncertainty that
would result from allowing each forum to interpret the Convention accord-
ing to its own legal tradition, interpretation of the Convention could not be
based on the jurisprudence of any one domestic system.1 19 The second
element of Article 7(1), the call for interpreting the CISG in light of the
need for uniformity, directly addresses this issue. Unfortunately, Article 7
fails to adequately establish this central principle.
The principle of promoting uniformity found in Article 7(1) is obvi-
ously closely related to Article 7's initial principle of interpreting the Con-
vention according to its international character. 120 Thus, the initial
theoretical question regarding Article 7 is whether these two phrases
should be considered separate principles or must be applied as a single
concept. As the following analysis demonstrates, these two criteria are
actually two facets of a single goal. Article 7's "international character"
principle is a prohibition against a parochial approach to interpretation of
the Convention. As indicated above, adherence to that principle often
requires reference to foreign case law. 121 The following section explains
how Article 7's second principle, "the need for uniformity," provides gui-
dance in the use of that foreign case law.
Ascertaining the legal content of Article 7's exhortation regarding the
"need to promote uniformity" in interpreting the Convention is problem-
atic. Certainly this criterion emphasizes both the nature and aspirations of
the Convention, but most commentators make no distinction between Arti-
cle 7's emphasis of the need for uniformity and Article 7's call for recogni-
tion of the international character of the CISG.12 2 In fact, one
commentator has stated that "the need to promote uniformity" is no more
than "a logical consequence" of interpreting the Convention according to
its "international character." 123 However, paragraph 1 of the Secretariat
Commentary to the 1978 draft maintains the separateness of the two crite-
ria in Article 7(1) by emphasizing that the criteria are complementary to
one another:
119. See id. at 66. See also Volken, supra note 50, at 41.
120. See HONNOLD, supra note 20, at 114.
121. See supra notes 113 and 115.
122. For example, Professor John Honnold initially distinguishes the two principles
but then proceeds to discuss only the legislative history of the criterion regarding the
Convention's "international character." See generally HONNOLD, supra note 20, at 114-
23.
123. See Bonell, supra note 86, at 72.
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National rules on the law of sales of goods are subject to sharp divergencies
[sic] in approach and concept. Thus, it is especially important to avoiding
differing constructions of the provisions of this Convention by national
courts, each dependent upon the concepts used in the legal system of the
country of the forum. To this end Article 7 emphasizes the importance, in
the interpretation and application of the provisions of the Convention, of
having due regard for the international character of the Convention and the
need to promote uniformity.' 2
4
The only way to create a uniform international jurisprudence as Article 7
requires, is for courts to interpret the CISG with an eye toward rendering
decisions which are compatible with existing decisions and are likely to be
compatible with subsequent decisions.12 5 Essentially, the criterion of uni-
formity incorporates the concept of precedent into the CISG. Conse-
quently, effective application of precedent in an international treaty
requires consideration of foreign court decisions.
Although the only way the criterion of uniformity has meaning is
through the use of international precedent, neither Article 7 nor its legisla-
tive history indicate the degree to which courts should defer to that prece-
dent. Certainly there is no indication that Article 7 establishes that
decisions in foreign jurisdictions are binding precedent in the sense of the
common law principle of stare decisis.126 Further, neither the Convention
nor its legislative history indicate whether courts are to afford foreign deci-
sions even the lesser weight required by the civil law principle of jurispru-
dence constante.127 Thus, while the Convention's requirement that
decisions from other jurisdictions be considered is clear, just how much
124. Commentary on the Draft Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of
Goods, Prepared by the Secretariat, Official Records, art. 6, cmt. 1. 7, U.N. Doc. A/
CONF.97/5 (1979 (1978 Draft)) [hereinafter Secretariat Commentary].
125. See Kritzer, supra note 106, at 109. See also Bonell, supra note 86, at 91-92.
The most effective means of ensuring uniformity in the application of the Con-
vention consists in having regard to the way in which it is interpreted in other
countries .... A judge ... faced with the same issue should in any event take
into consideration the solutions so far elaborated in other Contracting
States .... [However, a] judge.., faced with a question of interpretation of the
Convention may discover that.., divergent solutions have been adopted by the
different national courts. As long as the conflicting decisions are rather isolated
and rendered by courts of first instance, or the divergencies are to be found even
within one and the same jurisdiction, it is still possible either to choose the
most appropriate solution among the different ones so far proposed or to disre-
gard them altogether and attempt to find a new solution.
Id.
126. Nevertheless, the directive of Article 7 regarding the need to promote uniformity
indicates that decisions from common law jurisdictions should be at least persuasive
authority even in legal systems which operate without the common law principle of stare
decisis. See Kritzer, supra note 106, at 109.
127. [The doctrine of jurisprudence constante] embodies the principle that once a
matter has been decided the same way numerous times and thereby an official
interpretation of the written law, the court will follow this interpretation. In
effect, a series of consistent judicial decisions is granted the status of interpreta-
tion of the written law provided by custom.
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significance a court should attach to those decisions is not. 128 Without a
clear indication of how much significance a court should attribute to a
foreign decision, the principle of uniformity contained in Article 7 must be
applied with a measure of flexibility that is greater than that provided by
either of the principles of stare decisis or jurisprudence constante. This is a
serious weakness in the Convention. Without a clear theoretical basis for
evaluating the materiality of decisions from other jurisdictions, the princi-
ple of uniformity in Article 7 remains ambiguous.
Thus, while Article 7's call for uniformity is explicit and the means for
achieving that uniformity is clear, the utility of the uniformity principle is
questionable because Article 7 provides no guidance as to how much
authority those foreign decisions have. By failing to establish the legal sig-
nificance of foreign case law, Article 7 undermines its own goal of uniform-
ity - courts will independently determine how much weight to give to
foreign case law.129
D. Observing "Good Faith in International Trade"
Of all the principles contained in Article 7, the declaration that the CISG
must be interpreted so as to "[observe] good faith in international trade" is
the most puzzling. In fact, there seems to be no agreement as to what this
principle means or in what situation it is to be applied. 130 Negotiators
questioned the appropriateness of including the principle during discus-
sions of the Working Group' 31 and at the Vienna Conference.' 32 The leg-
islative history reveals that the Working Group ultimately included the
exhortation regarding good faith to draw the attention to emphasize that
high standards of behavior were to be expected in international transac-
tions.133 The parties at the subsequent Vienna Conference considered two
JOHN P. DAWSON, THE ORACLES OF THE LAW 416-31, 498-99 (1968).
128. See, e.g., Bonell, supra note 86, at 92.
A judge... may discover that... divergent solutions have been adopted by the
different national courts. As long as the conflicting decisions are rather isolated
and rendered by courts of first instance, or the divergencies are to be found even
within one and the same jurisdiction, it is still possible either to choose the
most appropriate solution among the different ones so far proposed or to disre-
gard them altogether and attempt to find a new solution.
Id.
129. Although I can point to no study for support, my sense is that the existence of
"persuasive authority" in the multi-jurisdictional system of the United States has not
significantly contributed to uniform interpretation of even identically-worded uniform
statutes such as the UCC.
130. See, e.g., Kritzer, supra note 106, at 109 ("While the regard to be given to its
references to internationality and uniformity of application seems clear, the legislative
history of the Convention's companion reference to good faith is cloudy."). See also
HONNOLD, supra note 20, at 123 ("One may hope that the scholarship in this area will be
developed further with special reference to the application of 'good faith' principles to
issues that arise in international trade.").
131. See Bonell, supra note 86, at 69.
132. See id. at 71.
133. See id. at 69.
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revisions of the "good faith" provision134 before deciding that the issue had
been sufficiently discussed by the Working Group and that further changes
were unnecessary. 135 Nonetheless, how and when the principle should be
applied remains unclear. Aside from Articles 19(2) and 21(2), which
require a party to dispel known misapprehensions of the other party,1
36
and Articles 47 and 63, which address the duty to accept the performance
one has demanded, 137 the CISG provides little guidance as to how courts
should apply the principle of "good faith."'138 Moreover, Articles 19, 21, 47
and 63 may not be relevant since those articles address particular conduct
of the parties, while Article 7 fails to establish whether the observance of
good faith is to be made in connection with interpretation of a contract
governed by the CISG 139 or interpretation of the CISG itself.1
40
The reference to observing good faith in paragraph (1) of Article 7
134. Both Norway and Italy suggested amendments. Italy's proposal would have
moved the language regrading good faith to a separate article. See A/Conf. 97/C.1/L.59.
Norway's proposal was to move the emphasis of good faith from what is now Article 7 to
the end of Draft Article 8 which discusses the conduct of the parties. See A/Conf. 97/
C.1/L.28. See also id. at 71.
135. See Bonell, supra note 86, at 71.
136. See CISG, supra note 1, art. 19, which states:
(1) A reply to an offer which purports to be an acceptance but contains addi-
tions, limitations or other modifications is a rejection of the offer and consti-
tutes a counteroffer.
(2) However, a reply to an offer which purports to be an acceptance but contains
additional or different terms which do not materially alter the terms of the offer
constitutes an acceptance, unless the offeror, without undue delay, objects orally
to the discrepancy or dispatches a notice to that effect. If he does not so object,
the terms of the contract are the terms of the offer with the modifications con-
tained in the acceptance.
(3) Additional or different terms relating, among other things, to the price, pay-
ment, quality and quantity of the goods, place and time of delivery, extent of one
party's liability to the other or the settlement of disputes are considered to alter
the terms of the offer materially.
Id. art. 21 states:
(1) A late acceptance is nevertheless effective as an acceptance if without delay
the offeror orally so informs the offeree or dispatches a notice to that effect.
(2) If a letter or other writing containing a late acceptance shows that it has been
sent in such circumstances that if its transmission had been normal it would
have reached the offeror in due time, the late acceptance is effective as an accept-
ance unless, without delay, the offeror orally informs the offeree that he consid-
ers his offer as having lapsed or dispatches a notice to that effect.
137. Articles 47 and 63 are beyond the scope of this article. See HONNOLD, supra note
20, at 125 for a similar observation regarding the application of good faith to Articles
19, 21, 47, and 63 of the Convention.
138. See Kritzer, supra note 106, at 109. See also HONNOLD, supra note 20, at 124
("These illustrations [regarding possible application of "good faith"], of course, are
incomplete and tentative."). The U.S. State Department had little to say about the Con-
vention's "good faith" requirement other than to note that the good faith requirement
found in UCC § 1-203 was broader. U.S. State Dept. Analysis, in GUIDE TO THE INTERNA-
TI oNAL. SALE OF GOODS CONVETIMON, 201.038 (1997) [hereinafter State Dept.].
139. See, e.g., Executive Legal Summary 232, in Guide to the International Sale of
Goods Convention, 100.007 (1997) [hereinafter Executive Summary] (stressing that
"[tihe important point to remember is that this good faith requirement is not a duty
imposed on the parties, but rather a guide for the interpretation of their contract.").
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might refer to the application of paragraph (2) of Article 7141 which
describes how courts are to fill gaps in the Convention. If that is so, then
the requirement to act in "good faith" in interpreting the Convention may
be a caution to courts not to jump too quickly to the conclusion that a
particular situation is not covered by the Convention and thereby prema-
turely apply domestic principles to resolve the dispute. 14 2 This approach
would have the effect of increasing uniformity in interpretation of the Con-
vention and greatly reduce the temptation of parties to forum shop. 143
Unfortunately, though reasonable, nothing in the legislative history of Arti-
cle 7 supports this interpretation. Ultimately, one may be forced to con-
cede that, as pointed out during the Working Group negotiations, the
emphasis on observing good faith in international trade was included more
out of a sense that it could do no harm rather than out of any conviction it
would do specific good. 14 4 Thus, one must conclude that the emphasis on
good faith as a tenet of interpretation is either an empty pronouncement
awaiting judicial decisions to give it content or an unfocused aspiration
which cannot be effectively applied by any court. The failure of Article 7 to
establish the legal content of this principle will likely result in a variety of
judicial interpretations which will produce uniformity through fortuity
rather than through the plans of the drafters of the CISG.
E. Applying the Convention's Unstated General Principles
Article 7(2) describes the means by which situations not covered by the
Convention are to be resolved. According to Article 7(2) such situations
must be resolved "in accordance with the general principles on which it
[the Convention] is based or, in the absence of such principles, in conform-
ity with the [domestic] law applicable by virtue of the rules of private inter-
national law [i.e., conflicts of law rules]." 145 On its face, this approach
appears to foster uniformity. However, since the general principles alluded
to in Article 7 are not explicitly stated in the Convention, they must be
divined by scrutinizing the Convention's provisions. This resort to general
principles to fill gaps in legislation is a standard approach in civil law sys-
tems 146 but is far less common in common law systems which traditionally
look to case law rather than legislation as the source of general princi-
ples. 14 7 For example, the resort to general principles under the CISG
140. Prof. Honnold alludes to, but does not expound upon, this possible application
of "good faith" in interpreting the Convention's principles rather than the terms of a
contract subject to the Convention. See HONNOLD, supra note 20, at 125.
141. See id.
142. See infra text accompanying notes 160 to 165.
143. For a similar conclusion, see Executive Summary, supra note 139, at 100.007.
144. Bonell observes that "[i]n support of the article's retention, it was first of all
argued that because of the universal recognition of good faith there would be little harm
in including it in the Convention." Bonell, supra note 86, at 69.
145. See CISG, supra note 1, art. 7(2).
146. See e.g., Austrian Civil Code of 1811, § 7; Italian Civil Code, art. 12 (prelim.
Provisions), Spanish Civil Code, art. 6; Egyptian Civil Code, art. 1.
147. In civil law systems, the legislated civil code provides the general principles as
well as whatever detailed provisions are needed. In common law systems, legislation
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appears similar to the UCC's reference to general principles under § 1-
103,148 but that surface similarity obscures a significant difference.
Although some sources consider the approaches to be essentially the
same,149 the fact remains that UCC § 1-103 emphasizes the supremacy of
the general principles of the common law unless the "particular provi-
sions" of the UCC displace those principles, while the CISG looks to its
own provisions for its unstated general principles.150 Given that the com-
mon law tradition looks to case law unless a statute provides specific cover-
age, 15' U.S. courts should be aware that Article 7(2) of the CISG requires a
different approach to filling in gaps in coverage: U.S. courts must stay
within the Convention as much as possible in search of either specific pro-
visions which may be applied by analogy or general principles which
underlie the entire Convention.' 5 2 Only if the search for analogous provi-
sions and general principles within the text of the Convention proves fruit-
less may a court apply analogous domestic law to the dispute before it.1 5 3
Unfortunately, U.S. decisions on the CISG repeatedly reflect an erro-
neous tendency to look first to case law, then to the statute. For example,
in Delchi, the Second Circuit stated the common law approach very clearly:
"Because there is virtually no case law under the Convention, we look to its
language and to 'the general principles' upon which it is based."'1 4 This
approach is incorrect; the proper starting point is the CISG's language, fol-
lowed if necessary by considerations of its general principles.' 55 Only if
these sources fail to produce an answer should analogous domestic law be
considered. This same incorrect starting point has been repeatedly used
by the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York in
often provides only the necessary details, while relying on existing case law to provide
the general principles. See Bonell, supra note 86, at 77. See also UCC, supra note 39, §1-
103, quoted in infra note 148.
148. "Unless displaced by particular provisions of this Act, the principles of law and
equity, including the law merchant and the law relative to capacity to contract, principal
and agent, estoppel, fraud, misrepresentation, duress, coercion, mistake, bankruptcy, or
other validating or invalidating clause shall supplement its provisions." Id.
149. See, e.g., Executive Summary, supra note 139, at 100.008 (stating that "[t]he
CISG's method of dealing with omissions resembles that of the UCC. Under both codes,
the courts look first to the code itself and then to a set of external norms.").
150. See supra text accompanying notes 145-47.
151. See supra text accompanying notes 92-104.
152. Bonell, supra note 86, at 78. See also Kritzer, supra note 106, at 115-16, discuss-
ing the method of analogizing provisions in the Convention.
153. See JOHN 0. HONNOLD, UNiFom LAW FOR INTERNATIONAL SALES UNDER THE 1980
UNITED NATIONS CONVENnON 157 (2d ed. 1991). See also Kritzer, supra note 106, at 117
When a matter is governed by the Convention but not expressly settled in it, the
Convention's solution is (i) internal analogy where the Convention contains an
applicable general principle; and (ii) reference to external legal principles (the
rules of private international law) where the Convention does not contain an
applicable general principle.
154. 71 F.3d at 1027-28.
155. As discussed earlier, interpretation of an unclear CISG provision calls for a court
to consider foreign and domestic cases concerning the CISG in an effort to achieve uni-
formity of application. See supra text accompanying notes 100-18.
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Filanto,15 6 Helen Kaminski,15 7 and Claudia.1 5 8 As pointed out earlier,1 5 9 a
court should look to the Convention's language first.1 60 If the CISG itself
does not provide an answer, then a court should look to CISG case law
(including case law from other nations) 16 1 for guidance in reaching a deci-
sion which will foster uniformity of results. 16 2 If no answer is found after
an examination of case law, then courts must look to the Convention's
unstated principles for guidance. Only if no answer can be achieved by the
foregoing means should analogous domestic principles be consulted.
Thus, the Delchi court's statement that the UCC "may also inform a court
where the language of the relevant CISG provisions tracks that of the
UCC"'163 is highly misleading because the provisions of Article 7 expressly
state that only if the sequence described therein 164 fails to provide an
answer is a court to look to domestic law.16 5 The Delchi court erred in
stating that a court may look to domestic law for guidance before seeking
that guidance in the general principles of the Convention.
However, discerning the unstated "general principles" of the Conven-
tion is left entirely to the particular court called on to apply the CISG,
thereby undermining the Convention's goal of achieving uniformity in
international sales law. The reason the Convention allows individual
courts to determine these general principles is evidently because the draft-
ers of the CISG were themselves ambivalent toward inclusion of this provi-
sion. Although Article 7 essentially continues the approach found in the
ULIS, 16 6 the Working Group initially considered deleting reference to "gen-
eral principles" in favor of stressing the Convention's "international charac-
ter" and the need for uniformity in its application. 167 Ultimately, though,
the Working Group decided on the wording which now appears in Article
7(2).168 The ambivalence of the drafters toward even referring to general
156. Filanto, 789 F. Supp. at 1237 (holding that "[tihere is as yet virtually no U.S.
case law interpreting the Sale of Goods Convention .... ").
157. Helen Kaminski, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10630, at * 3 (holding that "[there is]
little to no case law on the CISG in general.").
158. See Claudia, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4586, at *13 (holding that "[tihe case law
interpreting and applying the CISG is sparse.").
159. See supra text accompanying notes 96-113.
160. See supra note 104.
161. See supra note 100.
162. See supra text accompanying notes 119-29.
163. Delchi, 71 F.3d at 1028.
164. See supra text accompanying notes 75-80.
165. Interestingly, after beginning the opinion with the erroneous approach described
above, the Delchi court looks exclusively to the provisions of the CISG in resolving the
dispute. Although the court does not say as much, it is implicit in the opinion that the
court applied the Convention only because it could not first find U.S. case law. As
pointed out above, this approach is exactly the reverse of the proper sequence called for
by Article 7 of the Convention.
166. See ULIS, supra note 14, art. 17 requires that any matters not expressly governed
by the ULIS "are to be settled in conformity with the general principles on which the
present Law is based."
167. See Bonell, supra note 86, at 67-68:
168. See id. at 70. The nations at the Conference stressed the importance of the Con-
vention's international character and the need for uniformity by placing those principles
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principles may explain why the CISG does not explicitly identify those
principles. Unfortunately, merely the existence of different legal traditions
will inevitably lead to differences in the interpretation of these general
principles. 169 This leads to the unsatisfactory situation of requiring courts
to look for and apply general principles but without any guidance as to
how to accomplish this requirement.
Indeed, ascertaining the unstated general principles to which Article 7
refers may prove to be a daunting, if not impossible, task for a court. Even
though Article 7(1) provides three general principles (international charac-
ter, uniformity, and good faith), the previous three sections of this article
have pointed out that the legal content of each of those stated principles is
obscure. Determining the content of unstated principles would therefore
seem highly unlikely. What is certain though is that the failure to provide
either explicit general principles or clear methodology for determining
unstated general principles means that the Convention's goal of uniformity
rests on the hope that the national courts from the signatories to the Con-
vention will all arrive at the same conclusions. The possibility of uniform-
ity in ascertaining and supplying unstated general principles seems
remote, at best.
F. Ameliorating the Problems of Article 7
The obscure legal content of the explicit but ambiguous principles of Arti-
cle 7 and the vague nature of the unstated principles of the Convention are
unlikely to lead to uniform results in either application or interpretation of
the CISG. This is particularly true when the CISG is interpreted by courts
which apply a common law approach to every other case which comes
before them. °7 0 However, although it is not possible to achieve the Con-
vention's goal of uniformity without significantly amending the treaty, it is
in paragraph (1), while slightly subordinating the requirement of applying the Conven-
tion's general principles by placing it in paragraph (2). For a discussion of para-
graph (1) of Article 7, see infra text accompanying notes 91-141.
169. [A] common law jurist, because of his legal tradition, will probably tend
towards a more restrictive interpretation of the Convention and its provisions.
Thus, he might be more often confronted with a gap, than would a civil law
jurist. Civil law jurists are more frequently used to work [sic] with generally
framed, systematically conceived legal codes. Out of this experience they are
more readily prepared to solve unsettled questions or to fill gaps by referring to
the general principles contained in the code itself.
U. Huber, Der UNCITRAL-Entwurf eines Uebereinkommens uber Internationale
Warenhaufvertrage, RABELsZ 432-33 (1979) (as quoted in Volken, supra note 50, at 43).
See also HONNOLD, supra note 153, at 156:
This writer, although nurtured in the common law, has come to believe that
international unification [as required by the CISGI calls for us to reexamine our
traditional approach. Invoking domestic law under the Convention has more
serious consequences than invoking common law principles to solve problems
under a statute in a common law jurisdiction.
Id.
170. In addition to the United States, the common law nations of Australia, Canada
and New Zealand are parties to the CISG.
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possible to increase the likelihood of uniform interpretation in the United
States through a minor adjustment in U.S. CISG legislation.
Along with enacting the CISG as national legislation as discussed
above, 171 the Secretariat Commentary to the 1978 draft should be adopted
as the official commentary of the U.S. domestic CISG legislation with two
changes. First, the article references in the Secretariat Commentary
should be renumbered so that the current CISG article numbers corre-
spond to those in the commentary. Including this commentary would pro-
vide needed guidance for U.S. courts and lawyers when attempting to
understand a legislative scheme with so many civil law elements. Second,
the official comment accompanying Article 7 should include a statement
such as "decisions made by the courts of other nations are relevant juris-
prudence in interpreting the CISG as as to create a uniform, international
jurisprudence. Domestic law which is analogous to provisions in the CISG
should be considered only when the CISG and all relevant CISG case law
fail to provide adequate guidance." Such a statement would direct U.S.
courts to the appropriate approach to interpreting the CISG without resort-
ing to amending Article 7 itself.172 This legislative action would increase
the likelihood of a uniform body of CISG jurisprudence within the United
States by directing U.S. courts to render decisions consistent with those of
courts from other CISG signatory nations.
IV. The Inconsistency Involving the Parties to Whom the CISG
Applies
Article 1 of the CISG declares that the Convention applies to contracts
between parties located in nations that have ratified the Convention or
when conflicts of law analysis calls for applying the law of a ratifying
nation.173 This straight-forward provision is complicated by two other pro-
visions of the CISG which render uniform application virtually impossible.
The first is Article 10 which explains how the location of the parties to
171. See supra text accompanying notes 53-74.
172. Amending the provision could lead to confusion since the United States would
have ratified a treaty with one version of Article 7 but would have enacted domestic
legislation containing a different version of Article 7.
173. CISG art. 1 states that the Convention "applies to contracts of sale of goods
between parties whose places of business are in different States: (a) when the States are
Contracting States; or (b) when the rules of private international law lead to the applica-
tion of the law of a Contracting State . .. ."
The applicability of the CISG is far more restricted than that of the Hague Sales Con-
vention of 1964 which applies to all international sales of goods, even if neither the
parties nor their contract had any connection to a nation that had ratified the treaty.
ULIS Article 1 states in toto:
1. Each Contracting State undertakes to incorporate into its own legislation, in
accordance with its constitutional procedure, not later than the date of the entry
into force of the present Convention in respect of that State, the Uniform Law on
the International Sale of Goods (hereinafter referred to as "the Uniform Law")
forming the Annex to the present Convention.
2. Each Contracting State may incorporate the Uniform Law into its own legisla-
tion either in one of the authentic texts or in a translation into its own language
or languages.
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which Article 1 refers is to be determined. The second provision is Article
6 which seems to allow parties to contract out of the CISG.
A. The Uncertainty in Application of the CISG
Article 1(1)(a) applies the Convention to contracts of sale between parties
located in separate countries which have ratified the Convention without
regard to whether the goods in question cross international borders. 174 In
connection, Article 10 declares that a party's business location is that loca-
tion "which has the closest relationship to the contract and its performance
"175
The surprising result of the Convention's applicability being based on
the location of a party's place of business, rather than on the movement of
goods over borders, is that the CISG can apply to transactions which are
ostensibly domestic sales. For example, if a Paris-based branch office of a
New York corporation buys a product from a party located in Indiana for
delivery to a Montana address, that transaction may well be governed by
the CISG because the parties to the transaction are located in separate
CISG nations. Deciding whether the CISG applies in that situation will
hinge on a court's application of Article 10.176 Conversely, a court could
decide that the CISG does not apply if the Paris office ordered delivery to
its New York headquarters. In that instance the court could conclude that
New York is the location of the buyer because the New York office has the
closest relationship "to the contract and its performance."177 Therefore,
since both the buyer and the seller are located in the United States, the
CISG would not apply. However, it is also possible that the court could
conclude that the Paris office has the closest relationship to the contract
because the purchase and delivery orders, as well as payment, issued from
Paris. If so, then the court would rule that the CISG does govern the
contract.
3. Each Contracting State shall communicate to the Government of the Nether-
lands the texts which it has incorporated into its legislation to give effect to the
present Convention.
The CISG Working Group selected the location of the parties to the contract as a
means of determining the international character of the transaction as a correction to
the overreaching provision of Article 1 of ULIS. Volken, supra note 50, at 28. Thus, even
though
in nine out of ten cases the transnational character of a contract is determined
by the place where either the parties to the transaction of the goods themselves
are located .... [I]n defining the international character of a sales transaction,
the Vienna Convention refers only to the contracting parties without any refer-
ence whatsoever to the goods to be purchased.
Id. at 27.
174. See HENRY GABRIEL, PRACTITIONER's GUIDE TO THE CONVENTION ON CONTRACTS FOR
THE INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS (CISG) AND THE UNIFORMr COMMERCIAL CODE (UCC) 4
(1994).
175. CISG, supra note 1, art. 10. Article 10 also states that a party without a formal
place of business is deemed to be located at "his habitual residence." Id.
176. See id.
177. Id.
Cornell International Law Journal
Thus, the location of the parties criterion of Article 10 makes determi-
nation of whether the CISG applies to a particular contract highly problem-
atic and very unlikely to produce uniform results. Moreover, although the
CISG was drafted in part to eliminate the uncertainty that choice of law
rules created regarding the applicable law in international sales, 178 Article
10 re-introduces that uncertainty in another context by focusing on the
location with the closest relationship to the contract and its performance.
Ascertaining the applicability of the CISG would be much easier and
would produce uniform results if the CISG been made applicable to all
international sales involving goods which are shipped across national bor-
ders. However, the drafters of the CISG specifically rejected this approach,
considering it too expansive. In doing so, the drafters sacrificed their goal
of uniformity in favor of creating a more widely acceptable treaty.
B. Contracting Out of the CISG: The Theoretical Infirmities of
Article 6
Article 6 creates a major theoretical conflict within the Convention which
will inevitably lead to confusion and prevent uniformity in international
sales law. Article 6 appears to allow parties to avoid the CISG completely
because it states that parties are free to contract out of or vary the effect of
any provision of the CISG. 179 Support for this interpretation can be found
in the conclusions of various commentators who contend that parties to a
contract can avoid the CISG by inserting a choice of law clause in their
contract.180 Unfortunately for courts and practitioners called on to apply
the CISG, those conclusions are incorrect. Careful examination of the
principles of choice of law and the CISG provisions on contract formation
indicate that parties cannot completely contract out of the CISG. Rather
than creating uniformity, the broad wording of Article 6 creates confusion
regarding the extent to which parties can contract out of the CISG.
The difficulties surrounding the correct interpretation of Article 6
begin with its sweeping language. Article 6 allows parties to "exclude,"
"derogate from" or "vary" any of the provisions in the CISG. 181 This seems
to allow parties otherwise subject to the CISG to avoid the CISG com-
pletely; however, that is simply not possible when one considers the issues
178. See, e.g., Helen Elizabeth Hartnell, Rousing the Sleeping Dog: the Validity Excep-
tion to the Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, 18 YALEJ. INT'L L.
1, 6 (1993) (stating that "[tihe drafters [of the CISG] believed that the unpredictability
spawned by the conflict of laws was the key problem [in the area of international
sales]."); Lisa M. Ryan, The Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods:
Divergent Interpretations, 4 TUL. J. IN'L & CoMP. L. 99, 100 (1995) (stating that "[t]he
drafters of the CISG sought to replace the multitude of foreign laws which were previ-
ously applicable to foreign transactions with a single system of internationally adopted
uniform rules.")
179. CISG, supra note 1, art. 6 (holding that "[tihe parties may exclude the applica-
tion of this Convention or... derogate from or vary the effect of any of its provisions.").
180. See, e.g., Bonell, supra note 86, at 53-54; HONNOLD, supra note 20, at 105.
181. See CISG, supra note 1, art. 6.
Vol. 32
1999 Facing the Truth
surrounding formation of contract. 18 2 Choice of law principles reveal that
Article 6 cannot permit parties to avoid CISG rules on contract formation.
The conflict between the wording of Article 6 and the interpretation of Arti-
cle 6 required by fundamental choice of law principles creates confusion in
several ways.
The first source of confusion arises from the failure of Article 6 to
distinguish between two distinct sets of rules in every choice of law analy-
sis: (1) the rules applicable to whether the actions of the parties have led to
an enforceable contract (that is, whether the "contract" is valid) and (2) the
rules applicable once a contract has been formed.1 8 3 Since the CISG sets
out rules governing the actions of the parties with respect to formation of a
contract, 184 a court must always apply the CISG rules on formation of con-
tract to determine whether the actions of the parties actually resulted in a
contract. Parties may not avoid the application of the CISG to the question
of whether a contract has been formed by including a choice of law clause
in the memorialization of the contract. Only after a court concludes that a
contract has in fact been formed can a court give effect to a choice of law
clause within that contract declaring that the contract itself will be gov-
erned by law other than the CISG.18 5
182. But see HONNOLD, supra note 20, at 105 (asserting unequivocally that Article 6
allows parties to contract out of the CISG rules on formation of contract).
183. See, e.g., P.M. NORTH & Jj. FAwcErT, CHESHIRE AND NoRTH's PRIVATE INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW 457-58 (12th ed. 1992) which states:
[C]ontracts are planned transactions and the parties may well have considered
the question of what law should govern the contract in the event of a dispute
between them. They may have made provision in the contract, choosing the
applicable law. [Also] ... a wide variety of different contractual issues can arise.
For example, there can be a problem over whether a contract has been validly
created .... (emphasis added)
Id.
See also Siegelman v. Cunard White Star, 221 F.2d 189, 195 (2d Cir. 1955) in which
Judge Harlan, later Justice Harlan, stated:
As we have said, we construe the contract as establishing the intention of the
parties that English law should govern both the interpretation and validity of its
terms. And we think it clear that the federal conflicts rule will give effect to the
parties' intention that English law is to be applied to the interpretation of the
contract. Stipulating the governing law for this purpose is much like stipulating
that words of the contract have the meanings given in a particular dictionary.
See Cheatham, Goodrich, Griswold, & Reese, Cases on Conflict of Laws 461
(1951). On the other hand, there is much doubt that parties can stipulate the law
by which the validity of their contract is to be judged. Beale, Conflict of Laws @
332.2 (1935). To permit parties to stipulate the law which should govern the
validity of their agreement would afford them an artificial device for avoiding
the policies of the state which would otherwise regulate the permissibility of
their agreement. It may also be said that to give effect to the parties' stipulation
would permit them to do a legislative act, for they rather than the governing law
would be making their agreement into an enforceable obligation. And it may be
further argued that since courts have not always been ready to give effect to the
parties' stipulation, no real uniformity is achieved by following their wishes.
(emphasis added)
Id.
184. See CISG, supra note 1, arts. 8, 9, and 14-24.
185. But see Bonell, supra note 86, at 53-54.
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This restriction on the scope of Article 6 to post-formation issues is
supported by the legislative history, as well. Although the Secretariat Com-
mentary to 1978 Draft Article 5 (which is identical to current Article 6)
seems to indicate that Article 6 allows unfettered freedom to avoid the Con-
vention, a literal reading of the Secretariat Commentary reveals that the
freedom granted by Article 6 is limited to choice of law within a formed
contract. The Secretariat Commentary states that "[t]he parties may
exclude its [the Convention's] application entirely by choosing a law other
than this Convention to govern their contract .... 186 The broad wording of
Article 6 obscures the choice of law analysis inherent in any attempt by
parties to contract out of the CISG. As a result, incorrect conclusions
regarding the applicability of the CISG to international sales will continue.
Divergence rather than uniformity will result: in some countries courts
will correctly apply choice of law rules, while courts in other countries will
apply the incorrect conclusion of the commentators and allow complete
avoidance of the CISG. Only after a contract has been formed does Article
6 allow the parties to an international sales contract to select the law they
wish to govern the operation of their contract. 187
This problem is compounded in the United States by the CISG's char-
acter as a self-executing treaty. 188 Since treaties are equal in authority to
U.S. federal law,18 9 the CISG preempts all states laws with which it con-
flicts. As a result, the CISG, not the UCC as adopted by individual states,
governs international sales contracts involving U.S. parties. 190 This means
that a party who inserts a choice of law clause into a contract, such as "this
contract will be governed by the law of Oregon," has not selected Oregon's
UCC rules, but has actually selected the CISG which is state law by virtue
of the Supremacy Clause. Thus, not only will such a choice of law clause
fail to avoid the CISG provisions governing formation of contract, but that
clause will also fail to avoid application of the CISG to any contract formed
between the parties.
Article 6 also fails to account for the problems raised by the timing of
its invocation by the parties.1 9 1 Absent the extraordinary situation in
which the parties begin their negotiations with the declaration "we agree
that the CISG will not govern the agreement we may or may not subse-
quently negotiate," the CISG rules on formation of contract will definitely
govern some aspect of the negotiations. Even if the parties later agree that
some law other than the CISG governs their contract, it is impossible for
186. Secretariat Commentary, supra note 125.
187. Generally speaking, parties to international contracts are free to select as the law
governing the contract the law of any forum provided the selection of that forum has a
rational basis in relation to the contract. See, e.g., Seeman v. Philadelphia Warehouse
Co., 274 U.S. 403 (1927). The CISG has no provision regarding the legitimacy of the
selection of a particular forum's law; therefore whether a particular choice of law clause
is to be given effect will depend on a domestic law analysis.
188. See supra text accompanying notes 43-74.
189. See supra text accompanying note 45.
190. See supra text accompanying notes 39-74.
191. See Bonell, supra note 86, at 58.
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them to retroactively undo the negotiations which produced their choice of
law clause. The longer the parties wait to exercise their option under Arti-
cle 6, the greater the portion of their agreement will be subject to the CISG.
Technically, a lengthy delay in invoking Article 6 requires parties to either
modify or replace whatever agreement had already been created under the
CISG. While this can be accomplished with a clause stating that "this writ-
ing constitutes the entire agreement between the parties,"192 the unwieldy
interaction between Article 6 and the CISG provisions on contract forma-
tion make such a provision absolutely essential if the parties desire to
reduce their entire agreement to writing. Moreover, if the parties intend to
extend that agreement in the future, they must include a provision in the
current writing which declares that all future agreements will be governed
by a law other than the CISG. Without such a provision, all subsequent
negotiations may be interpreted as part of separate contracts fully subject
to the CISG. 193
The confusion surrounding proper interpretation of Article 6 is fur-
ther complicated by national reservations to the CISG.194 Article 96
allows nations to declare that they will not be bound by Article 11 of the
CISG, which permits oral contracts.195 While such a reservation requires
written evidence of a contract, a reservation to Article 11 will not avoid the
CISG rules on formation of contracts. In analyzing whether the parties
have formed a contract, courts in countries declaring such a reservation
must still consider the intent of the parties and the usage between the par-
ties as required by Articles 8 and 9. Although it seems to prevent consider-
ation of anything but written exchanges between the parties, a reservation
to Article 11 merely introduces a formal requirement that there be some
written evidence of the contract, not that the contract be entirely embodied
in writing.
V. Confusion Regarding Contract Coverage
A. Confusion Regarding the Contracts to Which the CISG Is Applicable:
Identifying "Goods"
Articles 1(1) and 3, respectively, state that the Convention applies to con-
tracts for the sale of goods, 196 and contracts for the supply of goods. 197
192. Such clauses are called "merger" or "integration clauses" and are designed to
eliminate the possibility of extrinsic oral elements of the written agreement.
193. Of course, even with such a clause the subsequent agreements would have to be
sufficiently related to the current contract to be considered extensions or modifications
of that original contract. Parties cannot contract out of the CISG for all contracts they
might conclude in the future simply because as separate contracts, the formation of
those new contracts would be governed by the CISG.
194. See CISG, supra note 1, arts. 92, 95 and 96 permit nations acceding to the CISG
to declare that they will not be bound by certain provisions.
195. See CISG, supra note 1, art. 11 (stating that "[a] contract of sale need not be
concluded in or evidenced by writing and is not subject to any other requirement as to
form. It may be proved by any means, including witnesses."). Id.
196. See id. art. 1.
197. See id. art. 3(1).
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Yet, the Convention does not define "goods." The Convention's failure to
define the subject matter of its coverage means that the accomplishment of
the goal of uniformity depends entirely on whether individual national
courts will reach the same conclusion regarding the definition of "goods."
Since Articles 2198 and 3199 list those sales contracts which are not covered
by the Convention, it is plausible to infer that all sales contracts not
expressly excluded from coverage are subject to the Convention. However,
unless this inference is limited to all sales contracts involving goods, the
inference dramatically expands the coverage of the Convention.20 0 Yet,
limiting this inference to the sale of goods only returns us to the initial
problem: the CISG has left it to national courts to define the essential sub-
ject matter of the Convention.
Although Article 2 excludes certain sales from coverage, the list of
excluded sales does not assist in deriving a definition of "goods" by nega-
tive inference. Article 2 expressly excludes from coverage the sale of ships,
vessels, hovercraft, aircraft and electricity. However, Article 2 does not
describe any of these items as "goods" but simply excludes from coverage
sales of these items. The legislative history of Article 2 reveals that electric-
ity was excluded because many legal systems had not conclusively classi-
fied electricity as a "good,"2 01 while ships, vessels, hovercraft and aircraft
were excluded because sales of these items typically included complicated
rules of owner registration.20 2 Thus, no definition of "goods" can be
198. CISG art. 2 states in toto:
This Convention does not apply to sales:
(a) of goods bought for personal, family or household use, unless the seller, at
any time before or at the conclusion of the contract, neither knew nor ought to
have known that the goods were bought for any such use;
(b) by auction;
(c) on execution or otherwise by authority of law;
(d) of stocks, shares, investment securities, negotiable instruments or money;
(e) of ships, vessels, hovercraft or aircraft;
(f) of electricity.
199. CISG, supra note 1, art. 3 states in toto:
(1) Contracts for the supply of goods to be manufactured or produced are to be
considered sales unless the party who orders the goods undertakes to supply a
substantial part of the materials necessary for such manufacture or production.
(2) This Convention does not apply to contracts in which the preponderant part
of the obligations of the party who furnishes the goods consists in the supply of
labour or other services.
Id.
200. For example, numerous international sales transactions involve services,
franchises, licenses and the right to use trademarks, copyrights and patents. Although
some contracts involving services are covered by the CISG, no one argues that the Con-
vention covers contracts that are not essentially for the sale of goods. See infra text
accompanying notes 214 to 226.
201. These sales were excluded because some legal systems had yet to determine
whether electricity should be considered a "good." See also Bonell, supra note 86, at 38-
39.
202. Secretariat Commentary, supra note 124, cmt. 9
"In order not to raise questions of interpretation as to which ships, [and] ves-
sels ... were subject to this Convention, especially in view of the fact that the
relevant place of registration, and therefore the law which would govern the
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inferred from Article 2's list of excluded sales.
Allowing the various national courts to independently define the sub-
ject matter of the Convention will inevitably lead to a lack of uniformity
because certain things currently sold internationally have yet to be classi-
fied as goods. As mentioned, the drafters of the CISG excluded the sale of
electricity from coverage because some nations had yet to classify electric-
ity as a good.20 3 The same lack of resolution awaits many technological
developments both small and great. For instance, the question of whether
software should be considered as a good has yet to be conclusively deter-
mined either in the United States 20 4 or internationally.20 5 Similarly, there
is no international agreement on the nature of television broadcasting. 20 6
The Convention's lack of a definition for goods will be an ongoing obstacle
to uniformity in international sales involving advances in technology.
B. Problems Determining Coverage of Contracts Involving Goods and
Services
The exceptions described in Article 3 distinguish between contracts involv-
ing the sale of services and those involving the sale of goods, but Article 3
does not provide a definition of either goods or services. Although this
ambiguity will not create surprises in most contracts, parties who do not
carefully plan agreements involving the supply of goods and services may
be surprised to find that those services obligations are also governed by
the CISG.
registration, might not be known at the time of the sale, the sale of all ships,
[and] vessels... was excluded from the application of this Convention."
Id.
203. See CISG, supra note 1, art. 2(f).
204. See, e.g., Micro Data Base Sys., Inc. v. Dharma Sys., Inc. 148 F.3d 649, 654 (7th
Cir. 1998) (pointing out in resolving a choice of law issue that the only case to address
the issue in Indiana held that software is a service, while the only case to address the
issue in New Hampshire held that it is a good.); Advent Sys. Ltd. v. Unisys Corp., 925
F.2d 670, 672 (3d Cir. 1991) (holding that "computer software is a good within the
Uniform Commercial Code."). Id.
205. See, e.g., Frank Diedrich, Maintaining Uniformity in International Uniform Law
Via Autonomous Interpretation: Software Contracts and the CISG, 8 PACE INT'L L. REV.
303 (1996); Marcus G. Larson, Applying Uniform Sales Law to International Software
Transactions: The Use of the CISG, Its Shortcomings, and a Comparative Look at How the
Proposed UCC Article 2B Would Remedy Them, 5 TUL. J. INT'L & CoMP. L. 445 (1997).
206. For example, the dispute between the United States and Canada over the Cana-
dian government's discontinuation of the Country Music Television channel is operating
in Canada centers on the classification of cable television broadcasts as either goods or
services. For a general discussion of this dispute, see Andrew M. Carlson, The Country
Music Television Dispute: An Illustration of the Tensions Between Canadian Cultural Protec-
tionism and American Entertainment Exports, 6 MiNN. J. GLoBAL TPADr 585 (1997). The
United States is involved in a similar dispute with the European Union over the EU's
requirement that EU broadcasters allocate no less than 50% of their airtime to European
works. Again, the characterization of television services as either goods or services is a
central issue in this dispute. See generally John David Donaldson, "Television Without
Frontiers": The Continuing Tension Between Liberal Free Trade and European Cultural
Integrity, 20 FoRaDHrm INT'L L.J. 90 (1996).
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Article 3 contains two exceptions from CISG coverage based on the
essential character of the contract at issue. The first paragraph of Article 3
excludes contracts for the sale of goods when "the party who orders the
goods undertakes to supply a substantial part of the materials necessary
for . .. [the] manufacture or production [of those goods]" (emphasis
added).20 7 Since the buyer in such a contract is providing the raw material
for the goods to be produced; the contract is considered a contract for man-
ufacturing services rather than the sale of goods.20 The ambiguity sur-
rounding the word "substantial" complicates this provision. In English,
"substantial" can have widely differing meanings. For example, "substan-
tial" has been defined as "material" as well as "considerable in amount,
value or worth."20 9 Indeed, although "substantial" does not mean "the
majority of,"2 1 ° the question of how "substantial" is to be interpreted can-
not be satisfactorily resolved without reference to a body of international
jurisprudence. 211 To date, though, no court has addressed this specific
question.212 The closest any court has come to addressing this issue is an
Austrian court's decision that the CISG did not apply to a contract in
which the buyer had supplied the seller with the materials for the produc-
tion of brooms and brushes.213 The court reasoned that the buyer had
supplied a substantial part of the materials to be used in their manufacture
and therefore the obligation of the seller was primarily the furnishing of
labor rather than goods.214 However, the Austrian court did not attempt to
define "substantial."
Article 3 also does not distinguish between materials which are physi-
cally a substantial part of the goods received and those materials which are
essential to the utility of the good produced.215 Article 3's use of the
ambiguous and relative term "substantial" will inevitably produce dispa-
rate judicial interpretation. Parties and courts are left without guidance in
207. See CISG, supra note 1, art. 3(1).
208. Secretariat Commentary, supra note 124, art. 3, cmt. 5.
209. WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE UNA-
BRIDGED 2280 (8th ed. 1986).
210. See infra text accompanying notes 226 to 230.
211. The Secretariat Commentary to the 1978 Draft does not discuss the precise
meaning of "substantial." See Secretariat Commentary, supra note 124, art. 3, cmt. 5.
212. A few commentators have addressed the issue, though, concluding that any-
where from 15% to 50% might be considered "substantial" by a court. See, e.g., Ferrari,
supra note 11, at 60-61.
213. See Zeitschriftfur Rechstvergleichchung, Austria Supreme Court, 8 Ob 509/93, as
summarized in GUIDE TO THE INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS CONvENMON 201.033
(1997).
214. Id.
215. An insight to this potential problem of interpretation can be seen in the differ-
ence between the French and English versions of the CISG. The official French text uses
the phrase "une part essentielle" because "[t]he drafters of the French version had diffi-
culty with the concept of 'substantial.'" See HONNOLD, supra note 153, at 106, n.3. The
difference in meaning between these two terms is significant. The French word "essen-
tielle" refers to something which has a crucial or indispensable quality to it rather than
the quantity of amount connoted by the English word "substantial." See, e.g., THE
OXFORD-HACHETTE FRENCH DICTIONARY 317 (1994).
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determining the degree and nature of materials which will prevent or
require application of the CISG.
The second paragraph of Article 3 presents a similar problem. Article
3(2) excludes from coverage contracts in which "the preponderant part of
the obligations of the party supplying the goods consists in the supply of
labour or other services."216 Since "preponderant" at least implies "major
part of,"2 17 the potential for interpretation problems seems less here than
with the interpretation of "substantial" under paragraph (1). However,
while "preponderant" must mean "more than half,"218 the Convention does
not indicate whether "preponderant" is referring to price, cost or value.219
This again returns one to the unanswered question of whether "preponder-
ant" is a reference to services which are extensive in time, labor, quality, or
are indispensable to the value of the good. Thus, the exact extent to which
the Convention applies to such mixed contracts remains ambiguous and
the possibility of uniform application of Article 3 remains uncertain.
220
C. Addressing the Problems of Ambiguity in Article 3
The ambiguity which arises from Article 3's failure to define either goods
or services will likely lead to disparate judicial decisions. At the very least
Article 3's ambiguity will surprise businesses which discuss supplying
"after the sale" services in connection to the goods they sell when the nego-
tiations over subsequent service obligations are determined to be governed
by the CISG rather than domestic law.
U.S. courts and businesses should be aware that although the CISG
explicitly excludes coverage of sales of certain goods, 221 the CISG applies
to more transactions than simply sales of goods. The sale of documents of
title to goods,222 contracts for the supply of goods,223 and some contracts
which involve the supply of services as part of a contract of the sale of
216. See CISG, supra note 1, art. 3(2).
217. See Volken, supra note 50, at 42.
218. Not only does "preponderant" have this meaning in English ("having superior
weight, force, or influence" or "having greater prevalence," WEBSTs'S THIRD NEW INTER-
NATIONAL DIcTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE UNABRIDGED 1791 8th ed. (1986)), but in
the context of Article 3, it must mean more than "substantial" which is used in the first
paragraph of the same Article.
219. Kritzer, supra note 106, at 73. But see Ferrari, supra note 11, at 62-63.
"[P]reponderant part" seems merely to refer to the comparison between the eco-
nomic value of the obligations regarding the supply of labor and services and
the economic value of the obligations regarding the delivery of the goods
.... Thus, where the economic value of the obligation regarding the supply of
labor or services is "preponderant," i.e., where it is more than 50 per cent ... the
CISG is inapplicable. (footnotes omitted).
220. The Official Commentary to the 1978 draft discusses neither the meaning of
"preponderant" nor to which terms in Article 3(2) it applies. See Secretariat Commen-
tary, supra note 124, art. 3, cmts. 2 and 3.
221. See supra note 198.
222. See Secretariat Commentary, supra note 124, art. 2, cmt. 8. See also CISG arts.
30, 34 and 58(1) which cover the duty to deliver documents representing title to goods.
223. See supra text accompanying notes 207-20.
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goods2 24 are all governed by the Convention. Therefore, U.S. parties
should initially assume that any contract involving any sale of goods
within a CISG signatory nation will be governed by the CISG. From that
initial working assumption, parties can then safely proceed without the
risk of unexpected coverage by the CISG. To avoid the potential coverage
of the CISG, parties who do not want their service obligations governed by
the CISG should be careful to enter into a separate contract for services
rather than include those obligations within the contract for the sale of the
items to be serviced.
Further, U.S. legislation which enacts the CISG should be drafted to
alert U.S. parties to the Convention's coverage beyond purely sale of goods
transactions. This can be accomplished by slightly altering the name of the
Convention in the U.S. Code to "The Convention for International Con-
tracts Involving the Sale of Goods and Related Services." Without modify-
ing the substance of the treaty, this change would both foster awareness of
the treaty and clarify the coverage thereby increasing the chances for uni-
form application of the CISG.
Of course, the greatest handicap to the creation of a unified jurispru-
dence of the CISG is the absence of an international court which would
resolve divergent interpretations of national courts. Since the creation of
an international sales court is not on the horizon, 225 other international
solutions must be considered. One way in which uniformity in interpreta-
tion and application of the CISG could be increased, and perhaps assured,
is through the existing mechanism of UNCITRAL.
Currently, UNCITRAL summarizes all judicial decisions involving the
CISG.2 26 In addition to having summaries of the decisions, national
courts would be greatly assisted in their efforts to evaluate foreign CISG
decisions if UNCITRAL would also indicate whether UNCITRAL approves
or disapproves of a particular summarized decision. The benefit of a sys-
tem in which UNCITRAL, an existing international body experienced in
issues involving international trade, would comment on CISG decision is
that UNCITRAL could provide needed guidance without impinging on the
autonomy of national courts. UNCITRAL comments would not be binding
on subsequent courts, but they would provide a means for independent
evaluation of the rapidly developing international case law. Without some
guidance from a central authority, the sheer weight of foreign-language
cases will be an obstacle to uniformity.
224. See id.
225. See, e.g., Frank Diedrich, Maintaining Uniformity in International Uniform Law
Via Autonomous Interpretation: Software Contracts and the CISG, 8 PACE INT'L L. Rav.
303, 303 (1996) ("With every new ratification [of the CISG], it becomes more unlikely
that an international court will be established to ensure the uniform interpretation and
application of the CISG.... Problems of binding force, seat and procedure may by too
great to overcome in interpreting the CISG.")
226. See supra note 18.
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VI. National Reservations to the Treaty Prevent Rather Than Assist
Uniformity
The Convention's allowance for reservations to various aspects of the CISG
both decreases uniformity and increases the likelihood of confusion
regarding the application of the CISG. Articles 89 to 101, contained in Part
IV of the Convention, address issues involving ratification, acceptance,
approval and declarations of reservations by nations regarding the CISG.
Article 98 explicitly declares that nations wishing to become parties to the
Convention may only make those reservations which are expressly author-
ized by the Convention.2 27 Part IV authorizes parties to the CISG to
declare that they will not be bound by Article l(l)(b), 228 Article 11,229
Article 29,230 Part II (formation of contract),2 3 1 and Part III (obligations of
buyer and seller and remedies for breach).2 32 Article 93 also permits
nations with two or more territorial units in which different systems of law
operate to exclude those areas from coverage under the Convention.
2 33
Finally, Article 94 permits nations which have already concluded an inter-
national agreement covering the subject matter of the CISG to opt out of
coverage by the CISG in favor of their existing agreements. 23 4 The purpose
of allowing those reservations was to make the CISG acceptable to a greater
number of nations. Unfortunately, the concessions which enable more
227. See CISG, supra note 1, art. 98.
228. See id. art. 95. Article 1(1)(b) extends coverage of the CISG when only one party
is from a CISG signatory state and choice of law rules call for application of the law of
the country that is a party to the CISG. Pursuant to Article 95, China (PRC), the Czech
Republic, Singapore, Slovakia and the United States declared that they would not be
bound by Article 1(1)(b).
229. See id. art. 96. Article 11 permits oral contracts. Pursuant to Article 96, Argen-
tina, Belarus, Chile, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Russian Federation and
Ukraine declared that in accordance with articles 12 and 96 of the Convention any pro-
vision of article 11, article 29 or Part II of the Convention that allows formation, modifi-
cation, or termination of a contract of sale or other indication of intention in any form
other than in writing does not apply where a party has his place of business in that
country. In essence, this reservation retains those nations' requirements that contracts
be in writing. China (PRC) made a reservation under Article 11 alone; applied literally,
the Chinese reservation requires a writing in order to form a contract, but permits oral
modification and termination of contracts under Article 29.
230. See id. CISG art. 29 permits oral termination and modification of contracts. See
supra note 239 for the list of countries making reservations to this article.
231. See id. arts. 92 and 96.
232. See id. art. 92. Pursuant to this article, Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden
declared that they would not be bound by Part II of the Convention governing formation
of contract.
233. See id. art. 93. Three nations have made reservations under this article: Austra-
lia declared that the Convention shall not apply to the territories of Christmas Island,
the Cocos (Keeling) Islands and the Ashmore and Cartier Islands; Denmark declared
that the Convention shall not apply to the Faroe Islands and Greenland; and New Zea-
land declared that the Convention shall not apply to the Cook Islands, Niue and
Tokelau.
234. See id. art. 94. This article allowed the Scandinavian countries (Denmark, Fin-
land, Norway and Sweden) to retain an extant treaty covering international sales among
them but still become parties to the CISG.
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widespread acceptance of the Convention [undermine] the Convention's
goal of creating a uniform law of international sales.
Excluding the reservations of the Scandinavian countries based on
their pre-existing Scandinavian-CISG agreement, seventeen nations have
made reservations to at least one article of the CISG, and twelve nations
have made multiple reservations.235 Far from creating a uniform law of
international sales, the reservations permitted by the CISG allow for multi-
ple variations on a theme. This is particularly true with regard to Articles
11 and 29 which dispense with the need for the contract to be in
writing.236
The potential for undermining international uniformity by allowing a
reservation to Articles 11 and 29 is great. For example, Argentina's reser-
vation excludes application of Article 11 and Article 29. Thus, Argentine
rules regarding the necessity and sufficiency of a writing for formation,
termination and modification of contract will apply to contracts otherwise
governed by the CISG. However, those Argentine rules regarding the neces-
sity and sufficiency of a writing are not likely to be the same as the rules of
the other eight nations which have opted out of coverage under Articles 11
and 29. This means that, as of this writing, one cannot speak of a single
CISG with regard to Articles 11 and 29, one must speak in terms of ten
CISGs: the CISG contained in the official text and the nine other CISGs
which, as a result of reservations, contain the law of nine different nations
regarding the sufficiency of writing in forming, modifying and terminating
a contract.
This proliferation of reservation-produced variations of the CISG is
further complicated by the particular language used by the nation declar-
ing the reservation. For example, China declared a reservation only with
regard to Article 11 which covers formation of contracts; China did not
make a reservation regarding Article 29 which allows a contract to be
orally terminated or modified.237 While it seems illogical to require a con-
tract to be in writing but allow it to be orally modified or terminated, this is
exactly what the Chinese reservation purports to do. Permitting such res-
235. See supra notes 231-34 for lists of articles to which reservations have been
declared and the countries which declared them.
236. CISG, supra note 1, Article 11 states in toto: A contract of sale need not be
concluded in or evidenced by writing and is not subject to any other requirement as to
form. It may be proved by any means, including witnesses.
CISG Article 29 states in toto:
1) A contract may be modified or terminated by the mere agreement of the
parties.
(2) A contract in writing which contains a provision requiring any modification
or termination by agreement to be in writing may not be otherwise modified or
terminated by agreement. However, a party may be precluded by his conduct
from asserting such a provision to the extent that the other party has relied on
that conduct.
Id.
237. The reservation of China reads as follows: "The People's Republic of China does
not consider itself to be bound by subparagraph (b) of paragraph 1 of article 1 and
article 11 as well as the provisions in the Convention relating to the content of article
11."
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ervations in this situation requires parties to an international sales con-
tract to be familiar with three layers of law: (1) the standard CISG
provisions, (2) the reservations each of their countries may have made to
the CISG (which includes interpreting the effect of those reservations),
and (3) the individual national laws regarding the sufficiency of writing in
the formation of a contract. Far from creating uniformity, allowing such
reservations requires contracting parties to think in terms of "which ver-
sion of the CISG might apply in this situation?"
This situation undermines uniformity still further because the Con-
vention frequently requires courts to apply the law of another nation. Arti-
cle 1 states that if the parties to the intended sale of goods are both from
nations bound by the CISG, then the CISG applies. This would seem to
simplify matters since a court called upon to address a dispute between the
parties would simply apply the CISG. This is not the case, though. A court
must still engage in a choice of law analysis before applying the rules of the
CISG. This step is made necessary solely because the CISG permits reser-
vations to its provisions. As a result, the CISG does not unify international
sales law, but instead adds a layer of complexity to the analysis. A court in
this situation does not simply apply the CISG, but must determine which
country's version of the CISG applies. Then the court must determine,
even though that nation is a party to the CISG, whether that country's
domestic law applies as a result of a reservation. For example, if the choice
of law analysis involving a purported CISG contract before a U.S. court
were to call for the application of the law of China, the appropriate analysis
would require a written contract because the law of China applies as a
result of China's reservation to Article 11. This conclusion would also
require a U.S. court to research, interpret and apply Chinese law to deter-
mine whether the relevant writing amounted to an enforceable contract.
It may be worth noting how many places a court can err in this situa-
tion because the complexity of the analysis alone is an obstacle to achiev-
ing uniformity. Suppose a U.S. court is called upon by a U.S. party and a
Chinese party to determine whether a contract exists between them. The
initial impulse of the U.S. court would be to apply the UCC and look for a
writing sufficient to meet the requirements of §2-201.238 However, since
the UCC has been supplanted by the CISG, the court would discover that
Article 1(1)(a) of the CISG states that the CISG applies when both parties
are from CISG countries, and the CISG does not require a writing. Article
I would seem to obviate the need for a choice of law analysis because even
if a choice of law analysis indicated that Chinese law applies, the court
would still be required to apply the CISG to the acts of the parties (and not
require a written contract). However, since China has opted out of Article
11, the court would discover that Chinese domestic law does apply, and
under Chinese law written evidence of the contract is required. At this
point the court - having correctly moved through an analysis which alter-
nately indicated that a writing is required, is not required, and ultimately is
238. See UCC § 2-201 (1999).
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required - must attempt to apply Chinese law as to the sufficiency of
whatever writing exists as evidence of the contract. Not only does this situ-
ation and its attendant pitfalls await every U.S. court, but every other court
in every other CISG country must negotiate the same maze only to face the
task of correctly applying foreign law rather than the CISG. Instead of nar-
rowing the possible results and thereby increasing the potential for uni-
formity, by allowing reservations to Articles 11 and 29 the CISG fosters a
proliferation of opportunities for courts to reach a virtually infinite
number of decisions.
Conclusion
The degree of the scope and importance of the CISG concerning U.S. trade
is readily apparent when one notes that the United States, Canada (the
United States' largest trading partner),239 and Mexico (the United States'
third largest trading partner),240 have all ratified the CISG.2 4 1 This means
that the CISG is the sales law of the North American Free Trade Area cre-
ated by NAFTA.242 Further, Chile, the nation most likely to be admitted to
NAFTA243 has also ratified the CISG 244 as has most of the European
Union.245 In fact, given the nations that have ratified the CISG,24 6 it is not
an exaggeration to say that the CISG governs the majority of international
sales contracts involving U.S. businesses. 247
239. See Office of Trade & Economic Analysis: U.S. Aggregate Foreign Trade Data-
Table 9 Top 50 Partners in Total U.S. Trade, 1991-1997 (last updated July 1998) <http://
www.ita.doc.gov/industry/otea/usfth/t09.prn>.
240. See id.
241. Mexico, December 29, 1987 (took effect January 1, 1989); Canada, April 21,
1991 (took effect May 1, 1992). See Table, supra note 1.
242. See Harry M. Flechtner, Another CISG Case in the U.S. Courts: The Pitfalls for the
Practitioner and the Potential for Regionalized Interpretation, 15 J.L. & CoM. 127, 133
(1995).
243. "The three NAFTA partners formally invited Chile to join NAFTA at the conclu-
sion of the 1994 Summit of the Americas. However, negotiations so far have been
stymied by the lack of U.S. fast-track negotiating authority." See 14 lNr'L TRADE
REPORTER 10, 411 (1997).
244. February 7, 1990 (took effect March 1, 1991). See Table, supra note 1.
245. The European Union nations that have ratified the CISG are: Austria, December
29, 1987 (took effectJanuary 1,1989); Belgium, October 31, 1996 (took effect November
1, 1997); Denmark, February 14, 1989 (took effect March 1, 1990); Finland, December
15, 1987 (took effect January 1, 1989); France, August 6, 1982 (took effect January 1,
1988); Germany, December 21, 1989 (January 1, 1991); Italy, December 11, 1986 (took
effect January 1, 1988); Luxembourg, January 30, 1997 (took effect February 1, 1998);
Netherlands, December 13, 1990 (took effect January 1, 1992); Spain, July 24, 1990
(took effect August 1, 1991); Sweden, December 15, 1987 (took effectJanuary 1, 1989).
See Table, supra note 1.
246. See supra note 34.
247. The CISG governs all the members of NAFTA as well as most of the European
Union. This means that the CISG governs transactions involving 3 of the top 5 trading
partners of the United States and 6 of its top 10 trading partners.
Although parties may opt out of the CISG's application top a formed contract, the
parties cannot prevent the CISG's application to the issue of formation itself. See supra
text accompanying notes 183-85.
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Even though awareness of the CISG appears to be spreading, as evi-
denced by the increasing rate of discussion of the CISG in U.S. court deci-
sions,248 a very simple legislative step would speed the awareness and
understanding of the CISG in the United States: the CISG should be
enacted as federal legislation. While the CISG's nature as a self-executing
treaty2 49 makes such legislation unnecessary in terms of application
within the United States, passage of domestic federal legislation would
place the CISG within the standard statutory scheme of the U.S. Code and
thereby notify U.S. lawyers of its applicability.250 Placement within the
U.S. Code as national legislation would eliminate any confusion as to its
application and would unequivocally notify U.S. courts, lawyers and busi-
nesses of its application.
Additional clarification of the scope of coverage of the CISG would be
achieved by the simple expedient of changing its name in the U.S. Code to
reflect its content more completely. U.S. legislation should modify the title
of the convention to "The Convention for International Contracts Involving
the Sale of Goods and Related Services."
Along with enacting the CISG as national legislation, the Secretariat
Commentary to the 1978 draft should be adopted as the official commen-
tary of the U.S. domestic CISG legislation. The only necessary changes to
the Secretariat Commentary would be to renumber the article references so
that the current CISG article numbers would properly correspond to the
commentary. Including this commentary would provide needed guidance
for U.S. lawyers when attempting to understand a legislative scheme with
so many civil law elements. One further change should be made in the
commentary - the official comment accompanying Article 8 should
include a statement such as "decisions made by the courts of other nations
are relevant jurisprudence in interpreting the provisions of the CISG
according to both its international character and the need for a uniform
jurisprudence in its interpretation." A statement like this would direct U.S.
courts to the appropriate approach to interpreting the CISG without resort-
ing to amending Article 8 itself.251
U.S. legislation regarding NAFTA should also be amended to include a
reference to the CISG coverage of contracts for goods (as defined by the
CISG) concluded between parties located in different NAFTA nations.
Again, this legislation would not alter the substance of NAFTA but would
248. Over a third of the U.S. decisions which cite the CISG have been issued in the
past two years. See supra note 40.
249. See supra text accompanying notes 43-47.
250. Although it is true that the CISG is already published in the Appendix to the U.S.
Code, it has no statutory sections as do other national laws. Moreover, the CISG is
almost impossible to locate in the Code: neither the index to the U.S. Code nor the
index to Title 15 refer to the CISG or any of the terms in its title. Further, the CISG is
not listed in the Table of Popular Names. Without the benefit of a computer search,
finding the CISG in the U.S. Code requires knowing its location beforehand.
251. Amending the provision could lead to confusion since the United States would
have ratified a treaty with one version of Article 8 but would have enacted domestic
legislation containing a different version of Article 8.
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provide additional guidance and notification to U.S. parties regarding the
applicability of the CISG.
These changes in U.S. federal legislation would clarify both the role
and application of the CISG in U.S. law. This clarification would assist the
United States in accomplishing the goals it sought in signing and ratifying
the CISG:
International trade now is subject to serious legal uncertainties. Questions
often arise as to whether our law or foreign law governs the transaction, and
our traders and their counsel find it difficult to evaluate and answer ques-
tions based on one or another of the many unfamiliar foreign legal systems.
The Convention's uniform rules offer effective answers to these
problems.252
This sort of clarification would also greatly reduce the current confusion in
U.S. courts over the proper application at the CISG in the United States.
The benefits of the federal legislation outlined in the preceding
paragraphs would be greatly increased if individual states would amend
the first clause of §2-102 of the UCC to read: "Unless the context appears
otherwise, this Article applies to transactions in goods not covered by the
Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods as contained in
Title 15 of the United States Code." This language would clarify coverage of
the UCC with regard to international sales and would unmistakably
announce the presence and location of the U.S. law which often supersedes
the UCC.
In the absence of such changes in legislation, U.S. attorneys and
courts should note at least the following aspects of the CISG. First, as a
U.S. treaty the CISG preempts state law253 and governs virtually all con-
tracts for the sale of international goods involving the nations of North
America and Europe.2 54 Second, location of the parties, rather than the
movement of goods across international borders, determines applicability
of the CISG;25 5 therefore, even transactions which are ostensibly domestic
transactions may be covered by the CISG.25 6 Third, the CISG mandates
that courts attempt to attain uniformity in interpretation of its provisions
by considering prior, relevant rulings by foreign courts. 2 57 Finally, the
CISG requires courts to begin their interpretation of the provisions of the
CISG itself and refer to principles and jurisprudence of domestic law only
as a last resort.25 8
Finally, UNCITRAL should include with its comprehensive summaries
of case law concerning the CISG a statement as to whether UNCITRAL
approves of the interpretation in that decision. Such a system would pro-
vide extraordinarily useful guidance in the application of a law which
252. Letter of Transmittal, supra note 29.
253. See supra text accompanying notes 62-65.
254. See supra text accompanying note 1.
255. See supra text accompanying notes 172-78.
256. See id.
257. See supra note 100.
258. See supra text accompanying notes 152-53.
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attempts to create uniformity but which has no judicial hierarchy for
resolving conflicting interpretations of its provisions.
Until Congress incorporates the CISG into the U.S. Code, and until
state law explicitly refers to the CISG, U.S. businesses and U.S. lawyers will
continue to experience both legal surprise and economic loss as a result of
their lack of awareness of the CISG and the applicability of its provisions.
Although the CISG's goal of uniformity in the area of international
sales is unlikely to be attained as long as the CISG exists in its current
form, implementation of the solutions proposed in this article would foster
a more uniform approach to the CISG both within the United States and
abroad. The more consistently the CISG is interpreted, the closer the ulti-
mate goal of the CISG, increasing national wealth through increased trade
in goods, will be to realization.

